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The online platform political economy—that is, the interrela-
tionship of economic and political power in the exchange of online 
services for personal information—has endowed platforms with 
overwhelming power to determine consumers’ information privacy. 
Mainstream legal scholarship on information privacy has focused 
largely on an economic problem: individual consumers do not ob-
tain their “optimal” level of privacy due to a bevy of market failures. 
This Article presents the political issue: that platforms’ hegemonic 
control over consumers’ information privacy renders the rules they 
impose illegitimate from a democratic perspective. It argues plat-
form hegemony over consumers’ information privacy is a political 
problem, in the first instance, due to the social foundations of nor-
mative information privacy and the social character of personal in-
formation. Although issues affecting society in this manner are typ-
ically met with government intervention—through the promulgation 
of law—or class-action litigation, neither of these safeguards have 
effectively protected consumers’ information privacy. Rather than 
empower consumers to determine information privacy norms and 
how to protect them, the law’s reliance on platform self-regulation 
through notice and consent has empowered platforms to make these 
determinations unilaterally. 
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Given the government’s failure to regulate effectively the plat-
form political economy, this Article proposes an alternative to  
government action. Specifically, this Article contends that the exist-
ing private governance of information privacy ought to strive for  
democratic legitimacy. This Article draws an analogy between the  
platform political economy and the labor political economy of the 
early twentieth century and proposes that concepts and mecha-
nisms from industrial democracy, which sought to legitimate work- 
place decision-making can serve as a toolkit for the legitimation of  
information privacy rules.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the online platform political economy—that is, the interrela-
tionship of economic and political power in the exchange of online 
services for personal information—platforms have overwhelming 
power to determine consumers’ online information privacy. Plat-
forms obtain this power through economic and structural forces: 
platforms have the economic incentive to extract as much commer-
cial value as possible from personal information and the structural 
ability to determine unilaterally what personal information they will 
collect, how they will use it, and what protections, if any, they will 
provide consumers.1 Individual consumers’ cognitive limitations 
and collective action problem magnifies their structural inability to 
counter platform power.2 Applicable bodies of information privacy 
law entrench platform power insofar as they explicitly or implicitly 
rely on industry self-regulation through notice and choice. Hence, 
information privacy is relegated to a system of private governance—
albeit hegemonic private governance—in which platforms unilater-
ally determine the information privacy afforded consumers.3 
Viewing the platform political economy as engendering private 
governance over information privacy requires a preliminary reori-
entation—one must first understand information privacy as affect-
ing society and not just individual consumers. The economics-based 
individualist paradigm, though helpful in describing platforms’ con-
centration of power, does little to explain the societal dimensions of 
information privacy. It postulates information privacy as a set of in-
dividual preferences to be satisfied vis-à-vis market forces. How-
ever, the manner in which it cabins information privacy to individual 
preferences and actions obscures the societal features of information 
 
1 See infra Section I.A. This Article describes the relationship between platforms and 
the people whose personal information they collect as one between platforms and 
“consumers.” “Consumer,” albeit, is an imperfect term to describe people’s place in 
platforms’ private governance of information privacy insofar as it might suggest a simple 
commercial relationship in which a seller and a purchaser exchange goods or services for 
valuable consideration. Alternatives, such as “data subject” and “data citizen,” are also 
imperfect in different ways. I chose to proceed using the term “consumer” to connote that 
the relationship between platforms and people is one arising from a private, commercial 
context. 
2 See infra Section I.A.  
3 See infra Section I.B. 
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privacy—that is, the social paradigm, in which information privacy 
is determined by and affects society at large. Within the social par-
adigm of information privacy, platforms’ control over consumers’ 
information privacy gives rise to a question of political legitimacy: 
who ought to determine consumers’ information privacy and how it 
ought to be protected? 
In the United States, we understand that the rules which affect 
society are legitimate when they emerge from democratic proce-
dures—those that enable public participation in community norm 
development and the promulgation of corresponding protective 
rules.4 Yet, typical democratic processes that protect against collec-
tive harms, such as curative legislation, government agency action, 
and private litigation have failed to place limits on platforms’ power 
over information privacy.5 These bodies of information privacy law 
have become so tethered to notice and consent that calls for their 
reform and expansion make no attempt to remedy the consumer dis-
enfranchisement brought about by this system of self-regulation.6 In 
the absence of government intervention, the private governance of 
information privacy lacks democratic legitimacy, as rule-setting 
platforms are hegemonic, opaque, and unaccountable to consumers. 
This Article proposes that, despite governmental inaction, de-
mocratizing private governance may legitimate information privacy 
within the existing legal framework. Just as democratic procedures 
legitimate political decision-making, information privacy’s private 
governance may attain democratic legitimacy when those governed 
by platforms’ information privacy rules are able to participate in de-
veloping them. 
Democratizing the private governance of information privacy 
may seem like a radical proposition, insofar as it is difficult to con-
ceptualize a disparate group of consumers counteracting platform 
hegemony.  However, theories of industrial democracy—which  
introduced the notion of democratic political legitimacy to decision-
making in the labor political economy—provide an interesting  
starting point to envision democratic platform information privacy.  
 
4 See infra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra Section I.B. 
6 See infra note 87 and accompanying text. 
796 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:792 
 
The concept of democratizing labor’s private governance by  
empowering workers took hold at the turn of the twentieth century, 
when employer hegemony over the terms and conditions of  
unskilled workers’ labor characterized the labor political economy, 
much like today’s platform-consumer relationship.7 Proponents of 
industrial democracy viewed worker collective bargaining organi-
zations, i.e., unions, as a centerpiece of democratic private govern-
ance.8 In their ideal type, unions democratized workplace decision-
making on three levels: internal, through their democratic formation 
and operation; procedural, through accumulating bargaining power 
counter to employers; and contractual, through entering bargaining 
agreements that determine labor conditions and hold employers  
accountable. 
Existing scholarship has conceived of a relationship between 
data (more broadly than personal information) and labor, arguing 
generally that users’ production of data is akin to labor that ought to 
be compensated and users ought to form unions to negotiate for just 
compensation.9 This Article takes no position on whether consum-
ers’ use of platforms amounts to compensable labor. Rather, it ar-
gues that labor provides a fruitful analogy to platform information 
privacy as both share similarly hegemonic political economies. Ac-
cordingly, industrial democracy can frame the democratic legitima-
tion of information privacy. As in the labor context, collective ac-
tion—here, on the part of consumers—ought to be a feature central 
to consumer enfranchisement with respect to information privacy. 
However, platform democracy will be characteristically different 
than industrial democracy: the platform political economy’s unique 
 
7 See, e.g., SYDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, at vi 
 (1897); JOHN H. GREENWOOD, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF TRADE UNIONISM 13 (1911). 
8 See, e.g., WEBB & WEBB, supra note 7, at 3–37 (describing primitive democracy of 
labor through trade unionism). 
9 Authors supporting a “labor” theory of the market for personal information have 
drawn the comparison to advocate for payments to Internet users for their “data labor.” See, 
e.g., Ryan Calo, Privacy and Markets: A Love Story, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 660 
(2015) (citation omitted); Imanol Arieta Ibarra et al., Should We Treat Data as Labor? One 
Hundred and Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 108 AM. 
ECON. ASS’N PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 38, 39 (2018); Should Internet Firms Pay for the 
Data Users Currently Give Away?, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 11, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/01/11/should-internet-firms-
pay-for-the-data-users-currently-give-away [https://perma.cc/B55C-TCM2]. 
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features, the organization of social life online, and consumers’ un-
derstanding of their information privacy suggest collective bargain-
ing in this context warrants certain departures and adaptations from 
industrial democracy’s model. 
 
I. THE PLATFORM POLITICAL ECONOMY & THE PRIVATE GOVERNANCE  
OF INFORMATION PRIVACY 
The Internet today is, in large part, a medium through which 
consumers share vast amounts of personal information while mak-
ing purchases, consuming news and entertainment media, and com-
municating with friends—among other activities. The online plat-
forms that provide these services and collect, process, and analyze 
consumers’ personal information in exchange have achieved tre-
mendous financial success, largely by leveraging “insights” from 
consumer data sets to sell third parties advertising services.10 The 
economics and structure of this data trade have imbued platforms 
with significant power to determine and diminish consumers’ infor-
mation privacy. In the face of platforms’ power, individual consum-
ers are effectively unable to protect their information privacy: they 
face cognitive limitations that impede them from taking information 
privacy protective actions and a collective action problem that im-
pairs their ability to extract additional information privacy protec-
tions from platforms.11 Existing information privacy law blesses 
platforms’ control of information privacy: as long as platforms pro-
vide accurate notice of their data-handling practices and honor con-
sumer choices—when platforms elect to provide choices—they are 
free to decide consumers’ information privacy. 
Mainstream legal scholarship regarding online information pri-
vacy has focused on the market’s failure to provide individual con-
sumers their desired level of privacy. Additionally, it has largely 
overlooked the political nature of platforms’ power to decide infor-
mation privacy regulation. There is, however, an emerging body of 
scholarship, including the works of Julie Cohen, Paul Schwartz, and 
Shoshana Zuboff, that focuses on the political aspects of information 
 
10 See JULIE COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF 
INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 37 (2019). 
11 See infra notes 25–45 and accompanying text. 
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privacy.12 In short, platforms’ power over information privacy is po-
litical due to the social foundations of information privacy and the 
social character of personal information. This power—to decide and 
grant, privately and unilaterally, information privacy—has enabled 
and supported platforms’ private governance over a sector of soci-
ety. In this context, platforms’ overwhelming and unchecked power 
over consumers calls into question their information privacy rules’ 
political legitimacy. 
A. The Platform Political Economy 
Platforms’ economics and structure have endowed them with the 
incentive and ability to determine unilaterally the extent of their per-
sonal information collection and use and, concomitantly, consum-
ers’ privacy with respect to that information. In this political econ-
omy, though consumers both consume the platforms’ products (i.e., 
advertising and, among other things, a social network, search  
engine, or marketplace) and supply resources that enable their pro-
vision (i.e., their personal information), they are unable to shape  
platforms’ rules that affect their information privacy.13 Without  
legal limitations on platforms’ power, hegemonic platforms’ 
 
12 See COHEN, supra note 10; see generally Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 1904 (2013); Julie E. Cohen, Irrational Privacy?, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 241 (2012); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the 
Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (2000); Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform 
Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133 (2017); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy 
in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1607 (1999) [hereinafter “Privacy and Democracy in 
Cyberspace”]; Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815 
(1999) [hereinafter “Internet Privacy and the State”]; SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF 
SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM (2019). 
13 Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1127 
(2000) (citation omitted); THE ECONOMIST, supra note 9; Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand 
Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. 
U. L. REV. 63, 132 (2003); Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Benefits and Costs 
of Online Privacy Legislation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 85, 102 (2002); Shaun B. Spencer, 
Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 843, 845, 891, 
898–99 (2002) (citation omitted). But see Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information 
Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1297 (2000) (noting commenters suggest transaction 
costs for individual consumer negotiation with platforms will be so low that individuals 
will be able to reach individualized bargains over their privacy); see generally Daniel D. 
Barnhizer, Propertization Metaphors for Bargaining Power and Control of the Self in the 
Information Age, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 69 (2006) (arguing individual consumers have 
bargaining power such that they should be expected to negotiate for their privacy). 
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information privacy rules lack political legitimacy in our democratic 
legal tradition. 
Platforms have powerful incentives to collect and process as 
much personal information as they can obtain; for many of these 
businesses, consumer personal information has become a key com-
mercial asset useful in large part to sell advertising.14 The tremen-
dous revenues produced by harvesting personal information have 
rendered the data trade a sort of “new economy”;15 one in which 
information is in constant supply and acquired by platforms at near-
zero cost.16 The profits available in this economy have unsurpris-
ingly led to even more businesses and technologies entering and 
coming to depend on it.17 The near-zero cost to obtain personal in-
formation may be attributed to the economic conditions of plat-
forms’ exchange with consumers. Many platforms provide consum-
ers with “free” services, which generate and collect consumer  
personal information as a “by-product” of using the service.18 Thus, 
consumers obtain a service for free that they ostensibly value at an 
above-zero cost, while platforms incur the comparatively small cost 
 
14 See, e.g., ZUBOFF, supra note 12; Samuelson, supra note 13, at 1126 (citation 
omitted); Anne de Hingh, Some Reflections on Dignity as an Alternative Legal Concept in 
Data Protection, 19 GERMAN L.J. 1269, 1270, 1278 (2018); Eur. Data Prot. Supervisor, 
Opinion 4/2015: Towards a New Digital Ethics, Data, Dignity and Technology, at 6 (Sept. 
11, 2015) [hereinafter “Opinion 4/2015”]; Stacy-Ann Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Data 
in the Era of the Internet of Things, 59 B.C. L. REV. 423, 428 (2018) (citation omitted); 
Ibarra et al., supra note 9, at 41; COHEN, supra note 10, at 38, 42; Joshua A.T. Fairfield & 
Christoph Engel, Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 385, 429–31 (2015); Spencer, 
supra note 13, at 898. 
15 See de Hingh, supra note 14, at 1270–71 (citation omitted); Opinion 4/2015, supra 
note 14, at 8; Elvy, supra note 14, at 435 (citation omitted). For example, “Facebook’s 
‘maneuverings to get [users] to open up’ have led to soaring advertising revenue, with 
advertising revenue of $3.8 billion in 2011, up from $1.86 billion in 2010.” Nicole A. Ozer, 
Putting Online Privacy Above the Fold: Building a Social Movement and Creating 
Corporate Change, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 238 (2012) (citation omitted). 
16 See Ibarra et al., supra note 9, at 41. 
17 See Barnhizer, supra note 13, at 70 (citation omitted); Olivier Sylvain, The Market for 
User Data, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1087, 1097 (2019). 
18 See, e.g., Steven A. Hetcher, The Emergence of Website Privacy Norms, 7 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 97, 102, 111, 130 (2000-2001); Barnhizer, supra note 13, at 
98-99 (citations omitted); Ibarra et al., supra note 9, at 38; COHEN, supra note 10, at 38–
44; Ozer, supra note 15, at 226 (internal citation omitted) (noting the “zero price effect” 
suggests consumers perceive “free” items as more valuable than they actually are). 
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of providing the service and obtain enormously profitable personal 
information from consumers as a result.19 
This exchange, however, incents over-collection of personal  
information because it does not capture the relationship between 
personal information collection and use and information privacy. 
The collection and use of some personal information come at a cost 
to information privacy.20 For example, collecting a person’s geolo-
cation when she is at an HIV clinic likely undermines her expecta-
tion of privacy. But platforms that rely financially on acquiring and 
analyzing personal information incur an opportunity cost (i.e., lost 
potential profits) when providing information privacy protections 
that limit the personal information they may collect and how they 
may use it.21 Information about the consumer’s location at the HIV 
clinic enables the platform to target her for antiretroviral drugs, 
making its advertising services more valuable to pharmaceutical 
companies. If the platform abstains from collecting or using this in-
formation, it loses the opportunity to obtain the associated advertis-
ing profits. Platforms, however, need not bear this opportunity cost 
as consumers routinely fail to “internalize” the cost to their infor-
mation privacy in dollars and cents.22 The clinic visitor, even if 
aware of the harm to her information privacy, is unlikely to reduce 
that harm to a monetary sum to then factor into the value she re-
ceives from the “free” service. Without consumers factoring infor-
mation privacy costs into their decisions to engage, platforms bear 
less than their actual costs and thus have the incentive to collect an 
 
19 See, e.g., Hetcher, supra note 18, at 102; Steven A. Hetcher, Changing the Social 
Meaning of Privacy in Cyberspace, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149, 167 (2001) (citation 
omitted) [hereinafter “Changing the Social Meaning”]; de Hingh, supra note 14, at 1278; 
COHEN, supra note 10, at 41. 
20 See, e.g., Vera Bergelson, It’s Personal but Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in 
Personal Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 424 (2003). 
21 See, e.g., Changing the Social Meaning, supra note 19, at 174–98; Jeff Sovern, Opting 
In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of Personal Information, 74 
WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1081–83 (1999). 
22 See Katherine J. Strandburg, Privacy, Rationality, and Temptation: A Theory of 
Willpower Norms, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1235, 1287–88 (2005); DIRK BERGEMANN & 
ALESSANDRO BONATTI, THE ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL DATA 3, 5 (2019); Ozer, supra note 15, 
at 227. 
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excess of personal information and under-provide information  
privacy protections.23 
The structure of the online platform environment endows plat-
forms with the ability to determine unilaterally the extent of their 
personal information collection and use and consumers’ attendant 
information privacy. Consumers have little choice over what infor-
mation they will reveal about themselves.24 Some information is dis-
closed automatically through web browsers25 and consumers must 
provide other information due to platforms’ design.26 The amount of 
personal information collected, and how it is used and shared, is the 
platforms’ choice—platforms present these conditions to consumers 
 
23 See Calo, supra note 9, at 659 (citation omitted); Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 
13, at 102; Spencer, supra note 13, at 891, 897–98 (citation omitted). For this opportunity 
cost to be in the platform’s interest economically, it would have to be offset, perhaps by 
increased consumer participation (and therefore additional usable personal information) or 
better-quality information. See Changing the Social Meaning, supra note 19, at 201. 
Though offering privacy protections personalized to the individual consumer may reduce 
the potential revenue reduction, this “privacy price discrimination” will nonetheless entail 
an additional expense the platform would seek to offset. See Litman, supra note 13, at 
1298; Spencer, supra note 13, at 891 (citation omitted). 
24 See James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. 
L. REV. 1, 65 (2003). Commenters writing in the early 2000s have expressed a counterview 
that consumers can take privacy protective actions by choosing to engage with privacy 
respecting websites and not engage with others, providing errant websites false information 
or stirring gossip about their practices, employing ad blockers, and blocking cookies, 
among other things. See, e.g., Steven A. Hetcher, The De Facto Federal Privacy 
Commission, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUT. & INFO. L. 109, 129 (2000) [hereinafter “De 
Facto Federal Privacy”]; Changing the Social Meaning, supra note 19, at 159–60; 
Christopher W. Savage, Managing the Ambient Trust Commons: The Economics of Online 
Consumer Information, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 95, 145 (2019); Hetcher, supra note 18, at 
114, 130; Spencer, supra note 13, at 894; McClurg, supra note 13, at 131–32. To be sure, 
some consumers engage in this kind of self-help. See Alessandro Acquisti et al., The 
Economics of Privacy, 54(2) J. ECON. LIT. 442, 447 (2016). For example, consumers 
sometimes pay a premium to purchase goods from more privacy protective merchants and 
teens have adopted a variety of strategies to engage online while protecting their privacy. 
Id. However, arguments that individual self-help suffices fail to appreciate the constrictive 
political economy consumers face with respect to online privacy (and some older 
arguments are based on an outdated view of the Internet). 
25 See Savage, supra note 24, at 101. 
26 See, e.g., Calo, supra note 9, at 661, 662 (citation omitted); Spencer, supra note 13, 
at 894, 900 (citations omitted); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of 
Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2010, 2036 (2013). 
802 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:792 
 
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.27 Even those platforms that provide 
consumers tools to opt in or opt out of various data-handling prac-
tices offer a highly circumscribed degree of “control” that may not 
accurately reflect consumers’ desires. The clinic visitor may deny  
a platform permission to collect her geolocation, yet the platform 
may nevertheless discover the clinic visitor’s location if she  
accesses the HIV clinic’s Wi-Fi network. Particularly where  
platforms share consumers’ personal information with third parties, 
such as service providers, data brokers, and advertisers, consumers 
are left unaware of the parties who obtain their information and lack 
any direct relationship with them, thereby precluding any semblance 
of “control.”28 Moreover, even if an individual consumer opts out of 
a platform’s information collection or “exits” the platform, the  
platform can still derive information about her from third parties,  
including other consumers, other websites via web trackers, and  
data brokers.29 Overall, the magnitude of platforms’ control over 
personal information collection, use, and sharing normalizes plat-
forms’ over-collection of personal information and under-provision 
of information privacy protections, to the point that consumers  
believe they are inevitable conditions of using platform services.30 
Moreover, an individual consumer’s threat to exit, or actual exit, 
from a platform imposes negligible costs on the platform and is thus 
unlikely to compel a platform to change its information privacy 
rules. Platforms typically derive value from consumers’ personal  
information by aggregating it over time, across consumers, and from 
various third parties—ultimately building comprehensive profiles 
 
27 See Savage, supra note 24, at 101, 106–07; Spencer, supra note 13, at 901; Paul M. 
Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2056, 2081–82 
(2004). 
28 See, e.g., Elvy, supra note 14, at 444–45; McClurg, supra note 13, at 136; Paul M. 
Schwartz, Privacy Inalienability and the Regulation of Spyware, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1269, 1270 (2005); Acquisti et al., supra note 24, at 447; James A. Rothchild, Against 
Notice and Choice: The Manifest Failure of the Proceduralist Paradigm to Protect Privacy 
Online (or Anywhere Else), 66 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 559, 563, 582 (2018). 
29 See also Schwartz, supra note 12, at 823, 827; Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at 
411 (citation omitted); Elvy, supra note 14, at 444 (citation omitted); Acquisti et al., supra 
note 24, at 464 (citation omitted); Rothchild, supra note 28, at 563, 582; Savage, supra 
note 24, at 106-07. 
30 Strahilevitz, supra note 26, at 2036 (citation omitted); Spencer, supra note 13, at 844, 
860, 863, 865 (citation omitted); COHEN, supra note 10, at 45. 
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that predict consumer behavior.31 In the process of collecting infor-
mation, each individual bit of information is far less valuable than it 
is in the aggregate, especially when the platform already has a com-
prehensive profile of the consumer.32 Additionally, the cost an indi-
vidual consumer incurs from exiting a platform far exceeds any pri-
vacy gain she could achieve. Platforms have become essential and 
ubiquitous to consumers’ daily lives. When a platform has a monop-
oly over a particular service or is supported by network effects,  
consumers are unable to exit without impairing their participation 
in commerce or social life.33 For a consumer, the cost of exit is  
concrete. By contrast, the privacy gain is both difficult to value (in 
part because it may not be reducible to dollars and cents) but also 
likely minimal, in light of platforms’ ability to obtain much of a  
consumer’s personal information regardless of her exit.34 
Individual consumers lack the economic and structural founda-
tions of power to protect their information privacy. Behavioral econ-
omists note that consumers face cognitive limitations—including in-
formation asymmetry, inter-temporal decision-making difficulty, 
and bounded rationality—and a collective action problem that limit 
significantly their individual bargaining power.35 Individual con-
sumers’ practical inability to protect their information privacy and 
the social foundations of information privacy, discussed later, sug-
gest that consumer communities, rather than individual consumers, 
ought to play a greater role in protecting information privacy. 
First, whereas platforms know what personal information they 
collect about any given consumer and how they use it, consumers 
 
31 ZUBOFF, supra note 12. 
32 THE ECONOMIST, supra note 9; BERGEMANN & BONATTI, supra note 22, at 6; Hahn & 
Layne-Farrar, supra note 13, at 104 (citation omitted); Spencer, supra note 13, at 897 
(citations omitted). 
33 COHEN, supra note 10, at 39, 43; Spencer, supra note 13, at 901; Hahn & Layne-
Farrar, supra 13, at 115; THE ECONOMIST, supra note 9. 
34 Spencer, supra note 13, at 897. 
35 Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1183, 1227 (2016); Strandburg, supra note 22, at 1288; Property, Privacy, and 
Personal Data, supra note 27, at 2078, 2080; Acquisti, et al., supra note 24, at 448; 
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 822; Spencer, supra note 13, at 845. 
804 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:792 
 
generally do not have access to that knowledge.36 Platforms typi-
cally provide privacy notices that ostensibly describe their collec-
tion, use, and sharing practices, but these notices often contain gen-
eral terms that obscure the platform’s practices and, moreover, do 
not apply to third parties with whom they share consumer infor-
mation.37 Platforms may also come to use consumers’ personal in-
formation in ways they cannot predict.38 Second, many consumers 
rationally fail to read privacy notices presented to them.39 By one 
estimate, it would take 244 hours for the average Internet user to 
read all of the privacy notices presented to her in a given year.40 
Beyond the “notice fatigue” she would experience by attempting to 
read all of these notices, the opportunity cost of actually engaging 
in this effort would render the attempt irrational.41 The value she 
 
36 Changing the Social Meaning, supra note 19, at 203–04; Strandburg, supra note 22, 
1302; de Hingh, supra note 14, at 1271–72; Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A 
Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 368 (2006); Nehf, supra 
note 24, at 62; Rothchild, supra note 28, at 584, 614 (citation omitted); Spencer, supra note 
13, at 892 (citation omitted); Acquisti et al, supra note 24, at 477. 
37 Elvy, supra note 14, at 445 (citation omitted); Lawrence Jenab, Will The Cookie 
Crumble?: An Analysis of Internet Privacy Regulatory Schemes Proposed in the 106th 
Congress, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 641, 667–68 (2001) (citation omitted); McClurg, supra note 
13, at 134; Schwartz, supra note 12, at 822; Nehf, supra note 24, at 63 (citation omitted); 
Rothchild, supra note 28, at 563; Spencer, supra note 13, at 896 (citation omitted). 
38 Kenneth Bamberger & Dierdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and On the 
Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 297 (2011); Jane B. Baron, Property as Control: The Case 
of Information, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 367, 382 (2012) (citation omitted); 
Patricia L. Bellia, Federalization in Information Privacy Law, 118 YALE L.J. 868, 898 
(2009). 
39 Elvy, supra note 14, at 442 (citation omitted); Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy 
Policies: Contracting Away Control over Personal Information?, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 
587, 588 (2007) (citation omitted); Priscilla M. Regan, Response to Privacy As a Public 
Good, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 51, 52 (2016); Rothchild, supra note 28, at 563; PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER, AMERICANS AND PRIVACY: CONCERNED, CONFUSED AND FEELING LACK 
OF CONTROL OVER THEIR PERSONAL INFORMATION, 57 (2019) (finding 23% of consumers 
often or always read privacy policies before agreeing to them and only 22% of consumers 
read all of a privacy policy presented to them). 
40 Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 
4 I/S: J. OF LAW & POL. 543, 563 (2012). See also PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 39, 
at 57 (finding 25% of consumers report are asked to agree to a privacy policy on an almost 
daily basis, 32% on a roughly weekly basis, and 24% on a roughly monthly basis). 
41 Rothchild, supra note 28, at 615–21. Exacerbating this opportunity cost is the fact 
privacy notices are continuously updated and consumers would have to check back to stay 
up-to-date with a given company’s practices. Id. at 616. Notice fatigue is compounded by 
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would gain from this knowledge, considering privacy notices’ gen-
eral inadequacy, is unlikely to meet or exceed the cost to obtain it.42 
Third, it is difficult for consumers to understand how platforms’ 
data-handling practices affect them, even when they read privacy 
notices.43 Consumers generally do not understand the information 
privacy consequences of sharing or protecting their personal infor-
mation and they cannot predict or understand the consequences of 
how platforms handle their information.44 Fourth, even if consumers 
read and understood the privacy notices presented to them, they gen-
erally cannot verify or monitor platforms’ compliance with their 
representations about their information privacy rules.45 
Consumers’ lack of knowledge exacerbates the difficulty of 
making inter-temporal decisions.46 Given consumers’ uncertainty 
about the future risks or rewards of providing a given platform their 
personal information and the immediate appeal of receiving a good 
or service (especially one that is “free”), consumers tend to discount 
the possibility and cost of future harm and provide more information 
 
“security fatigue,” i.e., consumers’ inability to make granular privacy choice across the 
myriad websites with which they interact regularly. Elvy, supra note 14, at 443–44. 
42 Rothchild, supra note 28, at 619–20; Spencer, supra note 13, at 899. 
43 Balkin, supra note 35, at 1227; Barnhizer, supra note 13, at 78–79; Elvy, supra note 
14, at 442; Haynes, supra note 39, at 588; Schwartz, supra note 28, at 1271 (citation 
omitted); Calo, supra note 9, at 672; Rothchild, supra note 28, at 563, 616; PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER, supra note 39, at 52–53, 57–58 (finding 59% of consumers report they understand 
very little or nothing about what companies are doing with the data they collect about them 
and 32% of consumers report they understand the privacy policies they read very little or 
not at all). 
44 Bellia, supra note 38, at 898; Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at 390; Acquisti, et 
al., supra note 24, at 444; Schwartz, supra note 12, at 822 (citation omitted); Rothchild, 
supra note 28, at 615; Ozer, supra note 15, at 226, 228 (citation omitted); Elvy, supra note 
14, at 486 (citation omitted); Balkin, supra note 35, at 1200 (citation omitted). Advocacy 
organizations have made efforts to inform the public about the effect of website data-
handling practices on consumer privacy in order to alleviate this source of asymmetry. 
Changing the Social Meaning, supra note 19, at 162. 
45 Balkin, supra note 35, at 1227; Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, supra note 27, 
at 2079; McClurg, supra note 13, at 134; Schwartz, supra note 28, at 1275; Hahn & Layne-
Farrar, supra note 13, at 114. 
46 Edward J. Janger, Locating the Regulation of Data Privacy and Data Security, 5 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 97, 105 (2010) (citation omitted). 
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than they would prefer in the long term.47 Moreover, under condi-
tions of “bounded rationality,” i.e., “the fact that humans face limi-
tations in the time they have available to gather information and in 
their cognitive abilities to process the information in order to arrive 
at a utility-maximizing decision,”48 consumers will likely accept 
whatever information privacy terms a platform presents to them,  
rather than attempt to bargain over the terms presented or create their 
own terms.49 
In addition to consumers’ cognitive limitations, free-riding and 
a collective action problem hinder individual consumers from bar-
gaining with platforms over their information privacy terms. Infor-
mation privacy is a public good: that is, whatever privacy there is 
among members of a community is inherently available to all, and 
one person’s “consumption” of privacy does not reduce the privacy 
available to others.50 Individuals, however, incur costs to adopt and 
maintain a level of privacy. In an online platform setting, producing 
information privacy may require a consumer to demand that a plat-
form adopt certain protections benefitting the whole consumer com-
munity. In this bargaining effort, the individual consumer incurs a 
cost, perhaps to form and communicate demands on the platform or 
to withhold her participation on the platform (and thus her supply of 
personal information and advertising consumption) until the plat-
form concedes.51 But the individual has a great incentive to “free 
ride,” i.e., to obtain the benefit without incurring the cost, because 
 
47 Regan, supra note 39, at 52; Savage, supra note 24, at 98; Ozer, supra note 15, at 226 
(citation omitted); Strandburg, supra note 22, at 1265–66, 1286 (citation omitted); Acquisti 
et al., supra note 24, at 447; Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at 391; Spencer, supra note 
13, at 898 (citations omitted). 
48 Rothchild, supra note 28, at 619 (citation omitted). 
49 Spencer, supra note 13, at 900 (citation omitted); Schwartz, supra note 12, at 822–23 
(citation omitted); Janger, supra note 46, at 105–06 (citation omitted); Schwartz, supra 
note 27, at 2081 (citation omitted); Strandburg, supra note 22, at 1238–39 (citation 
omitted). 
50 Schwartz, supra note 27, at 2084–85 (citation omitted); Fairfield & Engel, supra note 
14, at 418–19, 423 (citation omitted); De Facto Federal Privacy, supra note 24, at 120, 
131 (citation omitted); Hetcher, supra note 18, at 126. 
51 Spencer, supra note 13, at 900; see, e.g., Jennifer Huddleston, Preserving 
Permissionless Innovation in Federal Data Privacy Policy, 22 NO. 12 J. INTERNET L. 1, 24 
(2019) (citation omitted) (“[O]ne study finds that Facebook users would need to be paid up 
to $1,000 to leave the service for one year.”). 
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once another consumer obtains the information privacy standard  
for the community, she need not incur any cost to benefit from it.52 
This incentive to free ride gives rise to a collective action problem53 
that impedes consumers from acting individually to demand that the 
platform provide greater protections.54 That is, though consumers 
would benefit from greater information privacy protections, they 
will fail to take individual actions to achieve these protections  
because each individual would choose to free ride rather than incur 
the cost to act in the group’s collective interest.55 
B. A Legally Ratified System of Self-Regulation 
Applicable information privacy law, composed of sector-spe-
cific federal and state statutes, highly circumscribed common law, 
and limited agency action, has largely relegated information privacy 
to industry self-regulation and otherwise done little to regulate plat-
forms’ collection, use, and disclosure of consumers’ personal infor-
mation.56 These bodies of law entrench platforms’ dominance over 
information privacy insofar as they rely on individual autonomy and 
control57 in a platform political economy in which individuals are 
politically powerless. 
 
52 Spencer, supra note 13, at 900–01. 
53 De Facto Federal Privacy, supra note 24, at 120; Hetcher, supra note 18, at 115, 126; 
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 822–23 (citation omitted); Hetcher, supra note 28, at 1274–75; 
Strandburg, supra note 22, at 1286–87. 
54 Privacy Norms, supra note 18, at 116; Savage, supra note 24, at 111 (citation 
omitted); Spencer, supra note 13, at 891, 900 (citation omitted); Strandburg, supra note 
22, at 1247; Schwartz, supra note 27, at 2079. 
55 Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at 387, 425 (citation omitted); Spencer, supra note 
13, at 900; Regan, supra note 39, at 54 (citation omitted); Strandburg, supra note 22, at 
1247–48 (citation omitted). 
56 Hetcher, supra note 18, at 97–98 (citation omitted); Samuelson, supra note 13, at 1131 
(noting privacy laws generally do not recognize consumers’ rights to exert control over 
their personal information); Schwartz, supra note 12, at 827 (noting privacy laws do not 
provide individuals a general right to access their personal information). 
57 Elvy, supra note 14, at 430; Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 38, at 258–59 (citation 
omitted); Jenab, supra note 37, at 657, 660 (citation omitted); McClurg, supra note 13, at 
90 (citation omitted); Haynes, supra note 39, at 611 (quoting Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Privacy 
Self-Regulation: A Decade of Disappointment, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR. (Mar. 4, 2005), 
http://www.epic.org/reports/decadedisappoint.pdf [https://perma.cc/UVR8-B3V5]; 
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 854; Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 13, at 111 (citation 
omitted); Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data 
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Federal and state information privacy statutes ratify platform 
self-regulation through a notice and consent framework. The 
Gramm-Leach-Blilely Act, the Health Insurance Portability and  
Accountability Act, and the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act, for example, each contain exceptions to their respective limita-
tions when the covered entity obtains an individual’s consent.58 
State laws mirror the notice-and-consent approach:59 even the  
California Consumer Privacy Act, lauded as a major advance in  
consumer information privacy protection, requires covered entities 
to provide consumers only notice of their data-handling practices 
and limited opt-out choices.60 
Common law—particularly in tort, contract, and property—also 
broadly excepts from liability acts undertaken pursuant to notice and 
consent. Tort liability for certain invasions of privacy depends on 
whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy.61  
But, if a platform-defendant presented the plaintiff-consumer with 
an accurate privacy notice, it would be unreasonable for the plaintiff 
to have a different expectation of privacy.62 Moreover, the plaintiff’s 
consent to the defendant’s practice would eviscerate her tort claim.63 
Property and contract law, likewise, sanction actions undertaken 
with an ostensibly harmed individual’s consent.64 
 
Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2273 (2015); Nehf, supra note 24, at 48 (citation 
omitted). 
58 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq.; Privacy 
Rule, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 45 C.F.R. pt. 160, 
164(A), 164(E); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801, et seq.; Haynes, supra note 
39, at 597–99 (citation omitted); Nehf, supra note 24, at 6, 46, 58. 
59 Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 36, at 401; Bellia, supra note 38, at 885. 
60 Haynes, supra note 39, at 601–02 (citations omitted); Delaware Online Privacy and 
Protection Act, 6 Del. Code § 1201C, et seq.; California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, 
Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100, et seq. 
61 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B, 652D, 652E (1965). 
62 See, e.g., hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 994 (9th Cir. 2019); In re 
Nw. Airlines Priv. Litig., No. Civ.04–126, 2004 WL 1278459, at *5 (D. Minn. 2004); 
Deering v. CenturyTel, Inc., No. CV–10–63, 2011 WL 1842859, at *2 (D. Mont. 2011); In 
re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 263 F. Supp. 3d 836, 846 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
63 Elvy, supra note 14, at 486 (citation omitted); McClurg, supra note 13, at 70, 128–29 
(noting tort law’s respect for consent protects personal freedom and autonomy). 
64 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §§ 275, 284, 287 (1981); see, e.g., Cenna v. 
United States, 402 F.2d 168, 170 (3d Cir. 1968) (stating Pennsylvania conversion law is 
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Finally, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has explicitly 
relied on industry self-regulation through notice and consent.65  
The Commission has focused its enforcement related to information 
privacy on businesses’ misrepresentations or failure to follow their 
privacy notices and honor consumer choice (deemed “deceptive”) 
and misuse of personal information without providing any privacy 
notice (deemed “unfair”).66 Hence, businesses need only provide  
accurate disclosures of their practices and honor consumer choice, 
when they decide to provide choices, to mitigate the risk of FTC 
enforcement. 
Proponents of notice and choice generally laud its promotion of 
individual autonomy and control.67 The platform political economy, 
 
“the deprivation of another’s right of property . . . without the owner’s consent and without 
lawful justification.”); In re Gen. Plastics Corp. 184 B.R. 996, 1004 (S.D. Fla. 1995) 
(“There can be no conversion where a person consents to the possession by another of the 
assets allegedly converted.”). 
65 Through its authority under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the FTC 
has broad authority to police “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). 
66 Haynes, supra note 39, at 599–600, 603–04 (citing In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 
140 F.T.C. 465 (2005)); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. ToySmart.com, LLC, No. Civ.A. 00–
CV11341RGS, 2000 WL 1523287 (D. Mass. Aug. 21, 2000); In re Vision I Props., LLC, 
139 F.T.C. 296, 302 (2005); In re Gateway Learning Corp., 138 F.T.C. 443, 457 (2004); 
In re Educ. Rsch. Ctr. of Am., Inc., 135 F.T.C. 578, 596 (2003); In re GeoCities 127 F.T.C. 
94, 1999 FTC LEXIS 17, at *11 (1999); Terrell McSweeny, FTC 2.0: Keeping Pace with 
Online Platforms, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1027, 1036–37 (2017) (citing FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, PRIV. & DATA SEC. UPDATE: 2016 at 2–5 (Jan. 2017); Complaint at ¶¶ 13–14, In 
the Matter of Twitter, Inc., Fed. Trade Comm’n Matter No. 0923093 (Mar. 2, 2011) 
(Docket No. C–4316); Complaint at ¶¶ 17–18, In the Matter of Facebook, Inc., Fed. Trade 
Comm’n Matter No. 0923184 (July 27, 2012) (Docket No. C–4365); Complaint at ¶ 6, In 
the Matter of Google Inc., Fed. Trade Comm’n Matter No. 1023136 (Oct. 13, 2011) 
(Docket No. C–4336); Complaint at ¶¶ 6, 16–17, In the Matter of Snapchat, Inc., Fed. Trade 
Comm’n Matter No. 1323078 (Dec. 23, 2014) (Docket No. C-4501)) (describing cases 
against Twitter, Snapchat, and others alleging misrepresentations about privacy practices); 
Calo, supra note 9, at 683 (citation omitted); Steven A. Hetcher, The FTC as Internet 
Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2041, 2042–43, 2057 (2000) (citations 
omitted); Elvy, supra note 14, at 485 (citations omitted); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow 
Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 628–
29 (2014). 
67 Hetcher, supra note 18, at 102, 130; Changing the Social Meaning, supra note 19, at 
169; Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at 408–09 (describing dominance of privacy-as-
control theory and critiquing individual-focused education and empowerment as somewhat 
ineffective); Schwartz, supra note 12, at 820–22, 825 (asserting privacy-as-control must 
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however, unmoors notice and choice from the prospect that it gives 
consumers autonomy over their personal information. Instead,  
notice and choice likely exploit individual consumer vulnerability 
with respect to information privacy. Platforms are legally sanctioned 
to determine what, if any, information privacy protections they will 
provide and consumers are expected to exercise the options plat-
forms afford them, rather than to determine what protections and 
options ought to be provided in the first instance. Individual  
consumer consent or, more accurately, acquiescence to platforms’  
data-handling practices does not reflect consumer “autonomy” or 
 
allow meaningful choice); de Hingh, supra note 14, at 1280 (describing notice and choice 
solutions as focused on individual autonomy); Opinion 4/2015, supra note 14, at 4, 11–12 
(describing the European model which seeks to empower individual consumers with 
greater control). A deep discursion into the relative merits and pitfalls of relying on notice-
and-choice frameworks for privacy protections is beyond the scope of this Article. There 
is extensive debate on this matter, generally centered on whether consent mechanisms 
ought to be opt-in or opt-out. Sovern, supra note 21, at 1083, 1090, 1094, 1101–02 (arguing 
opt-out is ineffective in light of bargaining power imbalance); Savage, supra note 24, at 
1040 (arguing notice is inadequate in light of its unilateral determination by the particular 
business); Nehf, supra note 24, at 63, 67–68 (noting business incentives to make vague and 
limited commitments in privacy notices and indicating preference for opt-in over opt-out 
consent); Ozer, supra note 15, at 225–26, 240 (asserting greater transparency will lead to 
consumers better understanding privacy risks and taking more privacy protective actions); 
Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 13, at 98–101, 146–50 (evaluating arguments in favor of 
opt-in consent regime and stating consumers’ failure to act on opt-out opportunities reveals 
their preference for the particular transaction); Opinion 4/2015, supra note 14, at 12 (noting 
the volume of online activity places the notion of consent under strain); Rothchild, supra 
note 28, at 562–63, 608–11, 613–14 (describing failure of notice-and-choice model of 
privacy protection but nonetheless advocating for a privacy framework that affords 
individual consumers control over their personal information); Solove & Hoofnagle, supra 
note 36, at 368–70, 403 (advocating for notice and consent and arguing consumer choice 
is only meaningful where consumers have sufficient knowledge of businesses’ data-
handling practices); Elvy, supra note 14, at 433–35, 441–45, 466–67, 475, 486–87, 516, 
518 (arguing against notice and choice); Haynes, supra note 39, at 593, 596–97 (noting 
privacy notices bind the consumer vis-à-vis consent rather than the website operator); de 
Hingh, supra note 14, at 1274, 1278–79 (critiquing reliance on notice and consent); Litman, 
supra note 13, at 1310–11 (supporting notice and meaningful consent mechanisms); 
Schwartz, supra note 27, at 2103–06 (supporting opt-in over opt-out consent), 1272–74; 
Spencer, supra note 13, at 910–11 (advocating for opt-in consent and better notice); 
Strandburg, supra note 22, at 1303–04 (supporting opt-in consent and customized privacy 
plans that allow more granular choice); Jenab, supra note 37, at 642–43, 664, 666, 668–69 
(supporting notice and consent). 
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“control”68 in light of platforms’ ability to determine unilaterally 
consumers’ information privacy. 
C. The Individualist Paradigm and The Social Paradigm of 
Information Privacy 
Much privacy scholarship has focused on consumers’ inability 
to protect their information privacy in terms of market forces: con-
sumers’ cognitive limitations prevent them from receiving a market-
optimal level of information privacy.69 In line with existing infor-
mation privacy law, framing information privacy in terms of a mar-
ket allocation relies on an individualist paradigm. This paradigm 
characterizes information privacy as an individual’s control over the 
guarding or disclosure of her personal information, which requires 
others to respect the secrecy of the information she has chosen to 
guard.70 The individualist paradigm certainly helps frame the 
 
68 Savage, supra note 24, at 107, 109; Sovern, supra note 21, at 1094 (noting consumer 
acquiescence when opt-out consent is available is unlikely to reflect actual preferences); 
Ozer, supra note 15, at 225 (quoting Priscilla M. Regan, Associate Professor, Geo. Mason 
Univ., Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association: 
Privacy as a Common Good in the Digital World (1999) (“[P]eople are less likely to make 
choices that protect their privacy unless these choices are relatively easy, obvious, and low 
cost.”). 
69 Acquisti, et al., supra note 24, at 448 (citation omitted); Spencer, supra note 13, at 
891 (citation omitted); Ozer, supra note 15, at 226, 231; Strandburg, supra note 22, at 1239, 
1285–86, 1288 (citation omitted); Savage, supra note 24, at 109 (citation omitted); Calo, 
supra note 9, at 662 (citation omitted); Regan, supra note 39, at 52 (citation omitted); 
BERGEMANN & BONATTI, supra note 22, at 5; Ibarra et al., supra note 9, at 40 (citation 
omitted). 
70 Changing the Social Meaning, supra note 19, at 169–70 (arguing online privacy 
requires websites to abstain from collecting and using personal information except to the 
extent the consumer consents to the collection and use); Schwartz, supra note 12, at 820 
(describing privacy as control); Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 13, at 101–02 (describing 
belief that information privacy is a personal right pursuant to which individuals should be 
allowed to act in their own best interests with respect to guarding or alienating their 
personal information); Bergelson, supra note 20, at 402 (explaining control paradigm 
places the individual at the center of decision-making regarding the use of her personal 
information); Opinion 4/2015, supra note 14, at 12 (“Control is necessary but not 
sufficient.”); Baron, supra note 38, at 392 (describing privacy as control); Changing the 
Social Meaning, supra note 19, at 167 (noting an extreme view, with respect to information 
privacy, is “the less that personal data is collected and used, the better”) (citation omitted); 
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 828; Nehf, supra note 24, at 9, 35. C.f. Robert Post, Rereading 
Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV 647, 
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platform political economy, insofar as it describes why individual 
consumers are politically powerless against platforms that decide 
consumers’ information privacy. However, in the context of privacy 
protection, this paradigm focuses on satisfying individual prefer-
ences—however an individual sets the metes and bounds of permis-
sions and limitations with respect to information about her. This 
characterization of information privacy, sounding in data protection, 
ought not be confused with normative information privacy; that is, 
social norms concerning personal information.71 The social founda-
tions of normative information privacy, and the social character of 
personal information—the social paradigm of privacy—recast con-
sumers’ inability to protect their information privacy as a political, 
rather than economic, problem. The question of how to correct a 
failure in the market for information privacy does not answer the 
political question of who ought to determine what information  
privacy entails and how it ought to be protected. Rather, democratic 
theory suggests consumers should have a role in developing infor-
mation privacy norms and the rules that protect them. 
To be sure, individuals have particular preferences with respect 
to their privacy—to some, a portrait photograph may not personally 
offend, whereas to others, it may. But in either case, privacy’s social 
construction gives these preferences meaning. Understanding por-
trait photography as a practice that implicates privacy derives from 
shared expectations, intuitions, and standards of respect. In the con-
text of privacy torts, Professor Robert Post describes privacy norms 
as comprising “rules of civility” that constitute individuals and com-
munity.72 Privacy takes shape in the forms of respect individuals 
 
651 (1991) (quoting Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198, 
206 (1890)) (noting Warren & Brandeis’s privacy torts center on individual control). 
71 HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 3 (2019); Robert C. Post, The Social 
Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 
957, 963–64 (1989). 
72 Post, supra note 71, at 959; Post, supra note 70, at 652; see also Spencer, supra note 
13, at 853–54 (describing Post’s “civility rules”); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western 
Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1167 (2004) (describing 
Post’s “civility rules” as well as similar ideas in Warren and Brandeis’s article The Right 
to Privacy). Per Professor Post, privacy norms provide the basis for “dignitary privacy,” 
i.e., privacy rules that “follow[] a normative logic designed to prevent harm to personality 
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owe one another as members of the same community.73 The identi-
ties of both the individual and the community are, in some part, 
shaped by the observance of the community’s privacy norms.74 
Information privacy norms are constituted no differently than 
are privacy norms more generally; they are formed by common  
expectations regarding what personal information ought to be shared 
and how it ought to be used in different contexts and circum-
stances.75 Further, information privacy norms shape individual and 
community identity by ascribing meaning to various social prac-
tices.76 An individual “receives” information privacy when these 
norms are observed with respect to her personal information.77  
An intrusion on information privacy, by contrast, injures the indi-
vidual’s social personality and, when societally pervasive, leads  
to erosion of the norm.78 Preservation of information privacy,  
however, does not require norms to be fixed or uniform: as with any 
social norms, information privacy norms are characteristically non-
universal, deeply contextual, and constantly in flux.79 
 
caused by the violation of civility rules.” Robert Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: 
Google Spain, The Right to Be Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67 
DUKE L.J. 981, 982 (2018) [hereinafter “Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy”]. This 
contrasts with “data privacy,” i.e., those privacy rules that “operate[] according to an 
instrumental logic, . . . seek[] to endow persons with ‘control’ over their personal data,” 
and may be violated regardless of any showing of harm. Id. 
73 Post, supra note 70, at 651; Post, supra note 71, at 985. 
74 Post, supra note 70, at 668–69; Post, supra note 71, at 964. See also Spencer, supra 
note 13, at 853 (describing Frederick Schauer’s view that the harm underlying privacy torts 
is socially constructed). 
75 Strandburg, supra note 22, at 1238, 1259; Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at 423; 
Bergelson, supra note 20, at 402; Baron, supra note 38, at 394–95 (applying Post’s “civility 
rules” to information privacy); c.f. Savage, supra note 24, at 110 (arguing one individual 
can have some privacy even if others do not). 
76 C.f. Schwartz, supra note 27, at 1270 (describing value of information to community 
as well as individual); Schwartz, supra note 12, at 834 (calling information privacy a 
“constitutive value” that helps for the society in which we live and shapes individual 
identities). 
77 Post, supra note 71, at 968. 
78 Id. at 964, 966–68. 
79 Post, supra note 71, at 984 (describing socially determined variability of social norms, 
such as the character of the social occasion and the characteristics of the disclosure and 
recipient of information); Savage, supra note 24, at 109 (citation omitted) (describing 
scholars’ assertion that “privacy” describes a range of shifting and context-dependent 
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Consider a religious group as a type of community with shared 
expectations, meanings, and norms. One religious group’s infor-
mation privacy norms may encourage the dissemination of infor-
mation about its rites and rituals, but another religious group may 
find such publicity highly privacy invasive. A member of the rele-
vant community, who operates with the understanding of the com-
munity’s norm, may have a divergent preference if she did not in-
ternalize her community’s norm.80 Disclosing information about her 
religion’s practices may not offend her, though she understands it to 
be offensive within her community. The aggregation of these indi-
vidual preferences, though, does not equate to information privacy 
norms. The social underpinnings of information privacy are interre-
lational and normatively antecedent: if members of a community did 
not understand, among themselves, knowledge about their religious 
practices to have any social significance, “privacy preferences” with 
respect to their disclosure would be incoherent. 
The individualist paradigm’s inappositeness to addressing pri-
vacy protection is particularly acute in the platform political econ-
omy. This paradigm conceives of information privacy harms as af-
fecting individual consumers. The social character of personal in-
formation on the Internet complicates this premise—personal infor-
mation nominally about one individual bears implications about nu-
merous others, whether related by family or community ties, shared 
demographics, or other characteristics.81 Thus an individual’s loss 
of information privacy not only harms her, but also other similar or 
proximate individuals.82 “Individual” harms, at scale, also 
 
social norms); Spencer, supra note 13, at 844, 846 (noting societal expectations of privacy 
fluctuate with changing social practices and society inevitably disagrees about particular 
privacy expectations); Acquisti et al., supra note 24, at 446–47 (noting privacy sensitivities 
are subjective, idiosyncratic, and vary over time and across circumstances); Strahilevitz, 
supra note 26, at 2022; Samuelson, supra note 13, at 1172 (noting concepts of information 
privacy are evolving over time). See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 
(2009) (describing privacy norms as deeply contextual). 
80 Post, supra note 71, at 963. 
81 BERGEMANN & BONATTI, supra note 22, at 2. 
82 Strandburg, supra note 22, at 1261 (describing concrete individual harms from losses 
of privacy, such as identity theft and other forms of fraud); Nehf, supra note 24, at 26–27 
(describing individual harms as loss of dignity, autonomy, or self, as well as a loss of 
control over how information about an individual is used by others in a way that affects 
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undermine a community’s ability to form norms and overpower 
their expectations of information privacy.83 
Further, individual control presumes the individual, acting in her 
own interest, will preserve the community norm that gives her par-
ticular preference its meaning. This condition fails on the Internet, 
where the individual (and immediate) benefit is more palpable than 
the subtle erosion of the information privacy to which she ought to 
be entitled. 
Finally, the individualist paradigm takes platform information 
privacy rules as given. Scholars and lawmakers thus use the para-
digm to attempt to ameliorate individual consumers’ difficulties 
making preference-satisfying information-sharing decisions within 
a platform’s information privacy rules and otherwise do not question 
who ought to decide the rules that afford these decisions.84 Presum-
ing platforms decide their own information privacy rules overlooks 
and, in effect, displaces communities’ role in constructing and pro-
tecting information privacy norms.85 Reliance on the individualist 
paradigm therefore enables platform hegemony over information 
 
her); Hartzog & Solove, supra note 57, at 2283; Baron, supra note 38, at 390 (describing 
individual harm as loss of power to determine which facts about oneself are disclosed and 
how they are presented). In economic terms, the second-order harm felt by the community 
and other individuals within it is described as an “externality” because it is not borne by 
the individual whose information is disclosed. Savage, supra note 24, at 110; BERGEMANN 
& BONATTI, supra note 22, at 2. 
83 Fairfield and Engel write that the individual will contribute rationally to the erosion 
of her privacy vis-à-vis sharing personal information as long as the individual’s direct costs 
and share of social costs are together less than her private gain. Fairfield & Engel, supra 
note 14, at 423; see also Rothchild, supra note 28, at 614; Nehf, supra note 24, at 9, 14 
(describing the tradeoff between obtaining the benefits of information technologies and 
having to disclose personal information in the process); Acquisti et al., supra note 24, at 
477. But see Bergelson, supra note 20, at 402 (arguing individual control will not 
necessarily lead to erosion of privacy when combined with government supervision). 
84 Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 525–27 (1988). 
85 C.f. Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private 
Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1186–87, 
1194 (2018); Kate Klonick, The Facebook Oversight Board: Creating an Independent 
Institution to Adjudicate Online Free Expression, 129 YALE L.J. 2418, 2436 (2020). 
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privacy’s private governance, which precludes consumers from 
shaping and protecting the norms that characterize their identities.86 
D. Democracy without Government 
In a democratic society, collective harms are typically met with 
government intervention87 and private litigation. As in the case of 
environmental pollution, when a private entity harms society at 
large, the government intervenes to regulate and, perhaps, prohibit 
the offensive behavior.88 Similarly, class actions provide groups of 
citizens redress against collectively harmful behavior.89 However, 
as described, both government intervention and private litigation 
have failed to mitigate platforms’ erosion of communities’ infor-
mation privacy. Instead, information privacy law’s reliance on  
notice and consent has entrenched platform power.90 Even calls for  
legal reform have generally sought to improve notice and provide 
more granular choice mechanisms rather than reform the self-regu-
latory system that gives platforms overwhelming control over infor-
mation privacy.91 
 
86 C.f. Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing 
Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1617 (2018) (“‘[N]ew governance model[s]’ 
identify several features that accurately describe the interplay between user and platform: 
a ‘dynamic’ and ‘iterative’ ‘law-making process’; ‘norm-generating’ ‘[i]ndividuals’; and 
‘convergence of processes and outcomes.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
87 Hetcher, supra note 18, at 121; Strandburg, supra note 22, at 1292–94, 1304; Calo, 
supra note 9, at 677–78 (quoting Jules Coleman, Competition and Cooperation, 98 ETHICS 
76, 80 (1987)); Janger, supra note 46, at 105; Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at 420; c.f. 
Nehf, supra note 24, at 5 (stating the resolution to general societal concerns tends to be 
enforcement of a legal norm through government agency oversight and regulation). 
88 See generally, Omri Ben-Shahar, Data Pollution 6–7, 33–44 (Univ. of Chi., Pub. L. 
& Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 679, 2018) (calling for data regulation that conceives 
of privacy harms as “pollution” akin to environmental harms that justify government 
intervention). 
89 Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 
352 (2003) (“The class action mechanism is, of course, often posited as the preferred 
solution to aggregate cases where the collective harm is widespread . . . .”). 
90 See supra Section I.B.  
91 These calls for legal reforms include calls for federal omnibus legislation, FTC 
empowerment, and expansions to common law tort, property, and contract law theories and 
causes of action. Balkin, supra note 35, at 1199 (citation omitted) (describing Eugene 
Volokh’s proposed contractarian privacy framework); Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 
38, at 259 (citation omitted) (describing general support for omnibus legislation adopting 
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In the absence of governmental regulation, platforms’ private 
governance of information privacy lacks political legitimacy from 
the beginning. However, democratic theory suggests rules affecting 
society gain political legitimacy when they are determined by those 
whom they affect (and thus are not determined by an alien “ruling 
class”).92 Hence, private governance may gain political legitimacy 
if those affected are able to participate in its rule promulgation. 
Democratic freedom requires citizens to have a voice in the deci-
sions to which they are subject, whereas in an autocracy decisions 
are imposed on citizens through compulsion, requiring citizens’  
submission.93 Democracy does not require unanimity; some amount 
of dissidence can be presumed.94 Rather, democratic legitimacy is 
derived from “a basic agreement” in which citizens agree to be 
bound by their collective decisions, regardless whether they individ-
ually agree with them.95 In the context of First Amendment doctrine, 
Professor Robert Post explains the “essence of democracy” is the 
opportunity to participate in the formation of the communal will, 
through ongoing deliberation in which majority and minority views 
 
Fair Information Practices and, potentially, creation of a new data protection agency); 
Hartzog & Solove, supra note 57, at 2245, 2266, 2271–73, 2275, 2294, 2297–98 (arguing 
in favor of empowered and aggressive FTC); David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, 
Implementing Privacy Policy: Who Should Do What?, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 1117, 1125, 1136–37, 1142–43, 1145–47 (2019) (describing characteristics 
federal privacy law ought to have and arguing for expanded FTC jurisdiction due to its 
expertise, experience, and resources, or creation of a dedicated federal privacy 
commission); Litman, supra note 13, at 1288, 1312–13 (arguing in favor of expanded tort 
law, based on breach of confidence, because it would avoid the alienability trap of property 
rules and allow courts to appreciate subtle distinctions in context); Samuelson, supra note 
13 at 1127, 1150–51, 1156, 1158, 1167 (advocating for expanded tort law by setting a 
default rule forbidding certain data-handling practices absent consent); Solove & Hartzog, 
supra note 66, at 669, 673 (arguing the FTC should take holistic view of consumer 
experience when determining consumer expectations); see McClurg, supra note 13 (setting 
out in detail a tort approach to online privacy, expanding the appropriation tort). See also 
Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering 
Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1310–11 (1998) (citation 
omitted) (describing a range of other arguments in favor of contract).  
92 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 3, 
6 (Harper Collins Publishers 2004); c.f. PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL 
JUSTICE 24 (1969) (describing the morality of cooperation as emergent from below rather 
than imposed from above). 
93 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 92, at 3, 5. 
94 Id. at 9. 
95 Id. at 9; see also Post, supra note 71, at 978. 
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are heard.96 In this sense, democracy is not “majoritarian,” but rather 
the product of dialogic communication.97 
Platforms’ private governance, in which they unilaterally deter-
mine consumers’ information privacy98, lacks democratic legiti-
macy. In effect, platforms form a sort of “ruling class” that deter-
mines the information privacy consumers may receive and expect. 
Platforms’ determination of information privacy affect consumers 
individually and collectively insofar as platforms undermine and 
override consumers’ ability to generate the information privacy 
norms that shape their identities. Moreover, consumers have no 
voice in platforms’ decisions with respect to their information  
privacy. Platforms attain hegemonic status; consumers are their  
subjects. 
Democratic legitimation of information privacy may be possi-
ble, however, even without the promulgation of law. Within a  
system of private governance, it would require that those affected 
by private rules have a role in their determination. Accordingly,  
private governance of information privacy could gain democratic 
legitimacy if consumers were able to shape and determine infor-
mation privacy norms and the rules that protect them. Democratic 
private governance of information privacy cannot occur at the level 
of the individual consumer. Information privacy’s social founda-
tions indicate that communities, rather than individuals, form in- 
formation privacy norms in the first instance.99 And, practically, in 
the platform political economy, individual consumers lack the  
requisite bargaining power to affect platforms’ information pri- 
vacy rules. Moreover, the social character of personal information  
online suggests myriad other consumers may have an interest in  
 
96 Robert C. Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public 
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L REV. 1109, 1115 (1993) [hereinafter “Meiklejohn’s Mistake”]; 
see also Robert C. Post, Between Democracy and Community: The Legal Constitution of 
Social Form, in Democratic Community: 35 NOMOS: AM. SOC’Y POL. LEGAL PHIL. 163, 
170–71 (1993) (citation omitted) (describing Hans Kelsen’s view that self-determination 
is in the ability of persons to participate in the creation of their social order) [hereinafter 
“Between Democracy and Community”]. 
97 Between Democracy and Community, supra note 96, at 170–71 (citation omitted). 
98 See supra Sections I.A. , I.C. , & I.D.  
99 See supra notes 64–71 and accompanying text; see also ZUBOFF, supra note 12,  
at ch. 17 (calling for collective action to countervail the power of surveillance capital). 
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any individual’s information privacy.100 Hence, democratic private 
governance would require the consumer-community, as a collective, 
to be able to decide information privacy norms and the rules that 
protect them.101 
In 2009, Facebook attempted to “democratize” its platform gov-
ernance. It announced it would open up certain documents in its 
suite of Terms of Service to a user referendum designed by Face-
book; it planned to extend this same procedure to its Privacy Pol-
icy.102 The planned referendum process centered on user input on 
proposed “Facebook Principles” and a “Statement of Rights and Re-
sponsibilities” drafted by Facebook.103 It involved, at the first stage, 
virtual Town Hall meetings open to user comments and the solicita-
tion of written comments.104 Facebook would then review users’ 
comments, revise the two documents to incorporate any changes it 
decided to make, and release a summary of the most common and 
significant comments it received.105 The revised documents would 
then be submitted to a user vote on whether to adopt the documents, 
 
100 In the case of non-normative “data protection,” consumer collectivization may not be 
socially imperative, insofar as data privacy does not constitute individual and community 
identity. Regardless, collectivization may be practically imperative due to the 
government’s abstention from intervention, the social character of personal information 
online, and individual consumers’ inability to bargain effectively. 
101 Wikipedia is often offered a model of democratic private governance within the realm 
of speech regulation. See Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, in EMERGING 
THREATS (2017); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0 (2006); JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE 
OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT (2008); MIKE ANANNY & KATE CRAWFORD, 
SEEING WITHOUT KNOWING: LIMITATIONS OF THE TRANSPARENCY IDEAL AND ITS 
APPLICATION TO ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY (2016). Notably, Wikipedia’s data 
practices are not decided by dispersed, decentralized contributors in the same way as its 
content moderation. See Privacy Policy, WIKIMEDIA FOUND. (May 17, 2018), 
https://foundation.wikimedia.org/wiki/Privacy_policy [https://perma.cc/YV54-TTAG] 
(stating Wikipedia privacy policy is promulgated by the Wikimedia Foundation’s Board of 
Trustees). Whether the Wikipedia model of democratic speech governance could support 
democratic privacy governance is a rich question deserving of standalone attention and, as 
such, it is not pursued in this Article. 
102 See Facebook Opens Governance of Service and Policy Process to Users, FACEBOOK 
(Feb. 26, 2009), https://about.fb.com/news/2009/02/facebook-opens-governance-of-
service-and-policy-process-to-users/ [https://perma.cc/6HKD-G7YP]. 
103 See id. 
104 See id. 
105 See id. 
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scheduled to occur on a single day.106 That vote would become 
“binding” if more than 30% of then-active Facebook users (an esti-
mated 52 million users) voted.107 
When referendum day arrived, 665,654 users voted, with the 
majority in favor of adopting the proposals as written.108 Then, in 
2012, Facebook held a vote on a new policy—to get rid of voting.109 
Eighty-eight percent of the 668,500 votes cast opposed this revi-
sion.110 Facebook implemented the new policy regardless.111 
Setting aside the referendum’s implementation failure, its design 
reveals a key misunderstanding about democratic process. The op-
portunity to voice concerns and vote (ceremonially) in favor or 
against rules drafted unilaterally by a ruler does not amount to dem-
ocratic decision-making. Rather, it more closely resembles a form 
of authoritarian constitutionalism, which “accepts many governance 
features of constitutional democracy with the noteworthy exception 
of . . . democracy itself.”112 Facebook’s control over the decision-
making process precludes it from creating public discourse that truly 
instantiates democratic decision-making; democratic self-determi-
nation reaches past the substance of collective decisions and encom-
passes decision-making about the process of deliberation and deci-
sion-making as well.113 Democratic legitimacy thus requires the 
public to not only make decisions about societal matters collec-
tively, but also determine collectively the form and structure of the 
decision-making process. Even if Facebook had subjected its 
 
106   See id. 
107 Id.; see Facebook Opens Up Voting for Site’s Terms of Service, ADWEEK (Apr. 16, 
2009), https://www.adweek.com/performance-marketing/facebook-terms-voting/ 
[https://perma.cc/H9X6-YGAH]. 
108 See Adi Robertson, Mark Zuckerberg Wants to Democratize Facebook—Here’s What 
Happened When He Tried, THE VERGE (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/ 
2018/4/5/17176834/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-democracy-governance-vote-failure 
[https://perma.cc/4CVU-9J8K]. 
109 See id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 See David Pozen, Authoritarian Constitutionalism in Facebookland, KNIGHT FIRST 
AMEND. INST., COLUM. UNIV. (Oct. 30, 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/authoritarian-constitutionalism-facebookland 
[https://perma.cc/LK4R-FDSS]. 
113 Meiklejohn’s Mistake, supra note 96, at 1117. 
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Privacy Policy to a user referendum, the results of the process would 
not have been decided democratically. Instead, we can begin to  
understand how information privacy may be decided more demo-
cratically within the existing private governance system by looking 
to concepts from industrial democracy, which sought to democratize 
workplace decision-making through robust self-determination 
mechanisms. 
 
II. INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY AS A MODEL FOR PLATFORM DEMOCRACY 
Democratizing private governance is a novel approach to legiti-
mating platform information privacy. It has, however, been theo-
rized extensively as a response to an analogous context: the labor 
political economy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries.114 Confronting similar conditions of employer hegemony and 
worker powerlessness over the conditions of labor, concepts of in-
dustrial democracy arose to democratize workplace decision-mak-
ing.115 Industrial democracy borrowed heavily from political de-
mocracy, calling for workers to have the opportunity to participate 
in workplace governance.116 It sought to implement a number of de-
mocratizing structures that can be organized into three levels: first, 
in the internal processes of the intermediating bargaining institution 
(i.e., the union); second, through the rebalancing of bargaining 
power between workers and an employer vis-à-vis workers’ collec-
tive action; and, third, by governing the terms and conditions of la-
bor through a collective bargaining agreement which holds the em-
ployer accountable to its workers.117 
Industrial democracy may serve as a roadmap to democratize 
platform information privacy due to both the fundamental similari-
ties between the labor and online platform political economies and 
the notion that, in each, private governance ought to be legitimated 
 
114   See MILTON DERBER, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, 1865–1965, 
6–22 (1970) (tracing the history and theorization of industrial democracy from late 1797 
to the 1940s). 
115   Id. at 10. 
116   Id. at 10, 18–19. 
117   I categorize the structures proposed in industrial democracy literature into these three 
levels to lay out, in as streamlined a manner as possible, the process of making private 
governance more democratic from the inside out. This is not a taxonomy made explicit 
by any single source in the literature.  
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through democratic procedures. The dissimilarities of the platform 
political economy, however, suggest industrial democracy struc-
tures will have to adapt considerably to legitimate platform infor-
mation privacy. 
A. Labor and Online Platform Political Economies 
The labor political economy in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century shared fundamental characteristics with the plat-
form political economy. It similarly gave rise to a system of private 
governance in which employers had hegemonic power to determine 
the terms and conditions of unskilled workers’ labor.118 Employers 
were able to set wages and other conditions of labor—including 
hours, time off, fringe benefits, and health and safety precautions—
and they were incented to set these terms at their lowest cost.119 Em-
ployers’ overwhelming decision-making power came from their 
bargaining advantage relative to individual workers.120 Employers 
knew the state of the market and the demand for labor, were more 
skilled at bargaining by virtue of their past bargaining experience, 
and did not depend on employing any particular worker—therefore, 
they were indifferent to individual employment decisions.121 
 
118 Barnhizer, supra note 13, at 86–88, 93–94, 98–99 (citations omitted); Richard A. 
Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988, 991 (1984); Eric Tucker, 
Renorming Labour Law: Can We Escape Labour Law’s Recurring Regulatory Dilemmas?, 
39 INDUS. L.J. 99, 107 (2010). But see Horacio Spector, Philosophical Foundations of 
Labor Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1119, 1133 (2006) (arguing monopsonist employers are 
willing to provide contract terms that buyers, i.e., workers, are willing to pay for, such that 
the employer’s market power does not prevent free negotiation between the employer and 
an individual employee). 
119 Jedidiah J. Kroncke, The False Hope of Unions Democracy, 39 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 615, 
637–38 (2018) (citation omitted) (noting Elizabeth Anderson uses the term “private 
government” to describe the vastness of employers’ power over workers); Marc T. Moore, 
Reconstituting Labour Market Freedom: Corporate Governance and Collective Worker 
Counterbalance, 43 INDUS. L. J. 398, 408 (2014) (citation omitted) (“[W]ithin the typically 
broad limits stated in the employment contract, the entrepreneur is free to direct and 
organise [sp] the employee’s work in accordance with her own discretion and in light of 
the perceived exigencies of the business, without the need either to seek the assent of the 
employee to each ordered task or to negotiate the latter’s compensation for each task on an 
ongoing basis.”) 
120 GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 12–13. 
121 Id. at 13. 
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By contrast, individual workers had little power to decide the 
terms of their labor, let alone demand their employers adopt terms 
they favor.122 Though workers may have understood generally that 
they were undercompensated or worked in dangerous conditions, 
they lacked knowledge of business, their industry, and the demand 
for labor, which limited their ability to articulate demands on their 
employers.123 Additionally, workers were eager to be employed so 
that they could earn wages124; if there were only a small number of 
nearby employers, workers were unable to substitute employment125 
and, in general, they could not exit the labor market altogether—and 
forgo wages—while sustaining their lives.126 Moreover, employers’ 
control over labor terms and conditions led workers to believe they 
lacked the ability to exert any such control and, accordingly, they 
sought only modest rewards.127 
A collective action problem compounded individual workers’ 
inability to bargain. When workers are treated uniformly, the goals 
they pursue, i.e., higher wages and better working conditions,128 are 
“public goods” that suffer from a free-rider problem. An individual 
worker would incur costs to pursue these goals, but, once achieved 
by other workers, she could benefit without incurring any cost. A 
rational, self-interested worker thus would not incur the expenses, 
pecuniary or otherwise, to obtain higher wages and better working 
conditions and would instead rely on others to provide the good so 
 
122 See MARK PERLMAN, LABOR UNION THEORIES IN AMERICA 150–51 (1958); 
GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 12. 
123 See PERLMAN, supra note 122, at 201 (quoting SELIG PERLMAN, A THEORY OF THE 
LABOR MOVEMENT 239 (1928) [hereinafter “A THEORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT”]); see 
also GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 13. 
124 See GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 13. 
125 Judge Richard Posner skeptically acknowledges that workers may be either ignorant 
of their alternative employment opportunities or otherwise incur heavy costs by changing 
jobs. See Posner, supra note 118 at 991–92; see also Barnhizer supra note 13, at 93–94 
(citations omitted). 
126 See Eric Tucker, Renorming Labour Law: Can We Escape Labour Law’s Recurring 
Regulatory Dilemmas?, 39 INDUS. L.J. 99, 107 (2010); see also SELZNICK, supra note 92, 
at 144. 
127 See PERLMAN, supra note 122, at 200–201 (quoting A THEORY OF THE LABOR 
MOVEMENT, supra note 122, at 238–39). 
128 See generally ALBERT REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 27 (1962). 
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that she may benefit for free.129 This incentive to free ride creates a 
collective action problem—though workers would benefit from 
coming together to pursue higher wages and better working condi-
tions, they fail to do so because of the economic incentive to de-
fect.130 Individual workers’ divergent, or even antithetical, prefer-
ences may exacerbate this collective action problem.131 For exam-
ple, some workers may prioritize higher wages over more time off, 
or vice versa, and junior workers may oppose the seniority rights 
more senior workers would enjoy. Workers’ geographic dispersion 
would also make collective action more difficult to achieve.132 
Platforms’ sources of bargaining power mirror and expand be-
yond those employers enjoyed. Platforms, by virtue of their experi-
ence monetizing personal information, are able to evaluate the mar-
ket and demand for personal information.133 They may also be more 
skilled at bargaining due to their business experience and profes-
sional staff. Finally, they are indifferent to the collection of individ-
ual pieces of personal information and personal information from 
particular individuals, due to their relatively insignificant monetary 
value and platforms’ ability to obtain information from third par-
ties.134  
The ability to obtain personal information from third parties con-
fers an even greater bargaining advantage on platforms than 
 
129 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 11, 21 (1965); see also 
Posner, supra note 118, at 994. 
130 See Peter Levine, The Legitimacy of Labor Unions, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 
529, 546 (2001) (citation omitted). 
131 See OLSON, supra note 129, at 11. Writing in 1911, Greenwood describes the 
collective action problem as due to the “poverty, timidity, and lack of intelligence” that 
render workers almost incapable of self-organizing. GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 57–58. 
132 See D. Bruce Johnsen, Who Captures the Rents from Unionization? Insights from 
Multiemployer Pension Plans, 1 AM. BUS. L. REV. 193, 205–06 (2012) (citation omitted). 
133 Publicly traded companies, including Facebook and Google, file quarterly Form 10-
Q reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission that include managements’ 
predictions of market demand. See, e.g., Form 10-Q, 30, Facebook, Inc. (filed Oct. 30, 
2020) (stating management’s expectations about upcoming demand for online advertising 
services); Form 10-Q, 35–36, Alphabet, Inc. (filed Oct. 30, 2020) (stating management’s 
expectations about effect of COVID-19 pandemic on market). 
134 See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank A. Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for 
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 26 (2014); see also supra notes 23–24 and 
accompanying text. 
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employers have: even if a consumer abstains from a platform, that 
platform may nevertheless obtain a constant stream of her personal 
information as she browses webpages that contain the platform’s 
cookies or other plug ins.135 In the labor context, this would be  
the equivalent—however paradoxical—of an employer obtaining  
a worker’s labor regardless of the worker’s employment. And, 
whereas for labor, both employers and workers knew the existing 
wages and working conditions, only the platforms know precisely 
what personal information they collect, how they use it, and how 
their promised information privacy protections are operationalized. 
Moreover, platforms have the unique ability to undermine consum-
ers’ information privacy demands by leveraging their knowledge of 
each particular consumer’s interests, tastes, and beliefs. Altogether, 
platforms can be viewed as a type of “super bargainer” which hold 
sole knowledge about the subject of the bargain, are able to obtain 
what they seek regardless of their counterparty’s walk-away, and 
can manipulate their counterparty due to their vast and intimate 
knowledge. 
Likewise, consumers share a number of workers’ bargaining 
constraints, but suffer additional impairments due to structural dif-
ferences in the platform political economy. Akin to workers, most 
consumers know little of the market and demand for their personal 
information.136 But, because consumers also lack knowledge of how 
platforms collect and use personal information,137 they could not 
know the value platforms ascribe to their personal information or 
how platforms’ data-handling practices affect their information pri-
vacy. In this context, the difference between workers’ wages and 
consumers’ information privacy is evident. Workers know both the 
 
135 See, e.g., Dina Srinivasan, The Antitrust Case Against Facebook: A Monopolist’s 
Journey Toward Pervasive Surveillance in Spite of Consumers’ Preference for Privacy, 16 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 39, 70–73 (2019) (describing in depth the deployment of Facebook 
code on third-party websites for tracking purposes); see also John Koetsier, Google Is 




136    PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 39, at 60 (noting that 73% of survey respond-
ents heard little to nothing about the aggregation of personal data used to form compre-
hensive behavioral profiles for advertising and risk assessment purposes). 
137    See supra notes 37–46. 
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amount of their wages and how their wages affect their standard of 
living and hence could formulate demands for higher wages. By 
contrast, consumers do not know how their personal information is 
collected and used and do not know how those practices affect their 
information privacy. Without this knowledge, consumers could not 
know what to demand from platforms. 
Consumers’ need for platforms mirror, in part, workers’ need to 
work, but is somewhat more complex. Just as workers need to earn 
wages to support their lives and may be unable to substitute employ-
ers in their locality, consumers face concrete costs from abstaining 
from participation on certain platforms and may be unable to find 
adequate substitutes. Even for those platforms whose consumer 
products are not as essential as a worker’s wages, consumers are 
driven to engage because of the attractive value proposition of a 
“free” service, network effects, and addictive qualities. 
Finally, consumers, as compared to workers, face a greater col-
lective action problem. Consumers-at-large of online platforms are 
both geographically and socially distant. For example, Facebook us-
ers in India and Mexico are not only physically distant, but they also 
may not be connected through their networks of friends. Moreover, 
they come from cultures and sub-cultures that may differ substan-
tially on information privacy norms and standards. This stands in 
contrast to an employer’s workers who, though perhaps located in 
different cities, could nevertheless locate one another through their 
shared employment and could be expected to share a set of common 
cultural values and norms with respect to their labor. And, whereas 
workers’ preferences may diverge but are nevertheless concrete 
(e.g., a dollar amount of wages, a number of paid days off, or spe-
cific health and safety precautions), consumers’ information privacy 
preferences may be highly idiosyncratic, conflicting, and difficult to 
describe.138 
 
138   Consider, for example, three siblings. The first sibling elects to send her saliva sam-
ple to a company that uses it to diagnose food sensitivities and intolerances, target adver-
tising, and build and improve its products and services. She does not feel that any of these 
practices violate her privacy. The second sibling would send his saliva sample to the 
company if it used it solely to diagnose his food sensitivities and intolerances; using his 
biometric information for advertising and improving products would violate his desired 
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In the labor context, the bargaining-power disparity between 
employers and individual workers placed workers at the mercy of 
their employers with respect to wages and working conditions,139 
under threat of being forced down to a bare subsistence level.140 La-
bor scholars, most notably Sidney and Beatrice Webb, witnessed 
employer hegemony and, in the absence of worker-protective law, 
called for the private legitimation of workplace decision-making 
through democratic structures.141 Unions were a centerpiece in the 
movement for industrial democracy. The ideal labor union would 
channel and represent workers’ interests against overreaching em-
ployers,142 counteract the power imbalance inherent in the em-
ployer-worker relationship,143 and thereby enable workers to influ-
ence the terms and conditions of their labor. 
The platform political economy’s more pronounced bargaining-
power disparity yields a dynamic much the same as for employers 
and workers. Individual consumers are at the mercy of platforms 
with respect to their information privacy and they are already forced 
down to a level that maximizes financial returns to the platforms, at 
 
privacy in that information. The third sibling would consider the disclosure of her bio-
metric information to any company a violation of her privacy. Yet, the second and third 
siblings’ privacy preferences inherently conflict with those of the first sibling: when the 
first sibling shares her saliva with the company, the company obtains valuable infor-
mation not only about that first sibling, but about the second and third siblings as well, 
given that they share genetic characteristics. Not only do these siblings privacy prefer-
ences differ—but if one sibling’s preferences are granted, the other two siblings’ prefer-
ences are infringed. 
139 See GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 12; see Ruben J. Garcia, Labor as Property: 
Guestworkers, International Trade, and the Democracy Deficit, 10 J. GENDER RACE & 
JUST. 27, 36 (2006); see also Moore, supra note 119, at 416–17. See generally ZUBOFF, 
supra note 12, ch. 6. 
140 See GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 15, 30; see also Moore, supra note 119, at 411 
(describing employers’ allocative discretion due to the open-endedness of their ability to 
make decisions within the employment relationship). 
141 See WEBB & WEBB, supra note 7. See also GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 36; Tucker, 
supra note 126, at 108; Moore, supra note 119, at 415, 422. 
142 See Johnsen, supra note 132, at 205–06 (citation omitted). 
143 See Tucker, supra note 126, at 107, 114 (quoting J. W. Budd, R. Gomez, & N. Meltz, 
Why Balance Is Best: The Pluralist Industrial Relations Paradigm of Balancing Competing 
Interests, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON WORK AND THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
201, 201 (B. E. Kaufman ed., 2004); see Levine, supra note 130, at 547–48 (internal 
citations omitted); see Kate Andrias, Janus’s Two Faces, SUP. CT. REV. 21, 46–47 (2018); 
see also SELZNICK, supra note 92, at 144. 
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their information privacy’s expense. Just as poor wages and working 
conditions harmed workers, the harm to information privacy is seri-
ous. Platform hegemony precludes consumers, as a sector of society, 
from producing information privacy norms that form aspects of their 
identities. Though such societal harm would typically spur govern-
mental action, such an intervention is not forthcoming. Alterna-
tively, a private counterforce, helmed by the consumer community, 
may legitimate platforms’ information privacy rules by empowering 
and enfranchising affected consumers. 
Industrial democracy may instruct on how to theorize the de-
mocratization of platform information privacy. It builds from a start-
ing point characterized by hegemony and it provides a ready model 
for the translation of themes and structures from political democracy 
into private governance. Hence, features of industrial democracy 
can help frame platform democracy, but that frame must be filled 
based on the platform political economy’s divergences and idiosyn-
crasies. 
B. Democracy at Three Levels 
Proponents of industrial democracy sought to legitimate work-
place decision-making by deploying a number of democratizing 
structures, which may be organized into three levels: (1) internal, 
through the democratic formation and operation of a collective bar-
gaining organization (i.e., the union); (2) procedural, through work-
ers’ accumulation of bargaining power to counteract that of employ-
ers; and (3) contractual, through a mutually enforceable agreement 
that binds workers and employers, grants some of the workers’ de-
mands, and holds employers accountable. These structures would 
legitimate workplace decision-making much in the same way gov-
ernment is democratically legitimated: they allow workers to partic-
ipate in a sort of “public forum,” influence the terms that bind them, 
and hold employers-qua-decision-makers accountable to them. 
Though industrial democracy’s structures apply concepts of politi-
cal legitimacy to the particularities of the labor political economy, 
the labor and platform political economies’ fundamental similarities 
suggest these structures can help frame information privacy’s legit-
imation within private governance. 
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1. Internal Democracy 
Industrial democracy begins internally, through democratic self-
government within a collective bargaining organization—typically, 
a union. Unions, in their ideal form, achieve internal democracy 
through membership participation in union formation, its internal 
organization and procedures, including the articulation of demands 
on employers,144 and union leadership accountability to members. 
Unions form democratically through the establishment of a 
“common rule”: an agreement among a cohort of workers on the 
terms under which they will accept employment, an understanding 
among them that no one will accept less favorable terms, and the 
coordination of labor withdrawal (i.e., a strike) if their employer 
does not accede.145 Formation may be bottom-up, that is, led by a 
group of workers at a particular workplace, or top-down, in which 
an existing national organization reaches into a workplace to organ-
ize its workers. Whereas prior to the promulgation of labor law, un-
ions relied on employers’ voluntary or coerced acknowledgement to 
gain recognition as workers’ bargaining agent,146 labor law formal-
ized union formation through majoritarian voting. In short, after the 
National Labor Relations Board approves of a particular “bargain-
ing unit”—a group of workers that is sufficiently homogenous, yet 
distinct from other workers, to enable it to bargain on behalf of the 
entirety of the unit147—a majority of workers in that unit must agree 
to form a union.148 
 
144 See Kroncke, supra note 119, at 619; see Levine, supra note 130, at 544; see also 
Alan Hyde, Democracy in Collective Bargaining, 93 YALE L.J. 793, 794 (1984). 
145 See GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 16; see also Moore, supra note 119, at 423. 
146 See REES, supra note 128, at 28. 
147 See Andrias, supra note 143, at 24; see Posner, supra note 118, at 995 (citing National 
Labor Relations Act § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982)). Judge Posner notes the bargaining 
unit will ordinarily be limited to one factory even if the factory’s owner owns other 
factories as well and there are often more than one unit in a particular factory. Id. at 995. 
148 See Andrias, supra note 143, at 24; see Posner, supra note 118, at 993–94 (citation 
omitted). If less than fifty percent, but at least thirty percent of workers in the bargaining 
unit agree to unionize, the Board will order a representation election. See Posner, supra 
note 118, at 996 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1983)). Following an election campaign, 
members of the bargaining unit must vote on whether to make the proposed union the 
exclusive bargaining agent of the bargaining unit. See Posner, supra note 118, at 995 (citing 
29 U.S.C. §§ 9(a), 159(a)). A majority must vote in favor for the union to form. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 159(a). 
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Workers may then organize and operate a union democratically 
through worker participation in deliberation, election of representa-
tives, and voting.149 Unions are typically structured as representative 
organizations; members elect union officials who craft the union 
agenda and demands on employers and select negotiators to bargain 
on the union’s behalf.150 Procedures for membership participation 
may range, at the high end, from demand formation through delib-
eration and popular ratification of bargaining agreements,151 to vot-
ing for their officials, to the bare minimum of voting for the union’s 
formation. The greater opportunities for member participation the 
better for union democracy.152 When workers are able to make col-
lective decisions about the working conditions they seek, they 
 
149 See Levine, supra note 130, at 544, 568; see also Kroncke, supra note 119, at 619. 
150 See REES, supra note 128, at 174. There is a robust debate on the extent to which 
representative governance reduces union democracy. Scholars supporting representative 
democracy in unions argue that workers benefit from relying on experts to represent them 
to negotiate on their behalf due to the complex nature of calculating wage rates, the 
difficulty of negotiations between a large number of workers and a single or multiple 
employers, the superior knowledge of the industry representatives attain through the 
bargaining process, and representatives’ proclivity to make more tempered (and thereby, 
agreeable) demands on employers. See GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 16, 40; see PERLMAN, 
supra note 122, at 152, 153; see Hyde, supra note 144, at 830; see REES, supra note 128, 
at 180; see also DONALD L. MARTIN, AN OWNERSHIP THEORY OF THE TRADE UNION 86–87 
(1980); ORLEY ASHENFELTER & GEORGE E. JOHNSON, BARGAINING THEORY, TRADE 
UNIONS, AND INDUSTRIAL STRIKE ACTIVITY 36 (1969). On the other side of the debate, 
scholars acknowledge that agency costs (i.e., the transaction costs principals incur to 
monitor and constrain their agents) make it difficult for workers to monitor their 
representatives, which could lead to representatives’ unchecked abuse of their role. See 
Johnsen, supra note 132, at 206–08; see Levine, supra note 130, at 544–45. Others argue 
relying on representation makes the bargaining process inherently “less participatory and 
less democratic.” See Hyde, supra note 144, at 867–937. 
151 See PERLMAN, supra note 122, at 150, 153 (quoting U.S. Comm’n on Indus. Rel., Joint 
Agreements, at 193–94 (unpublished research paper) [hereinafter “Joint Agreements”]). 
152 Professor Alan Hyde argues union democracy requires a baseline of member 
participation that includes, among other things, the opportunity for members to express 
their views on potential bargaining demands (especially through small, unstructured 
meetings and referenda), member communication with their negotiators, member 
representation on the negotiating team, member ratification of all bargaining demands and 
all proposed agreements with employers, members’ right to oppose agreements, and 
negotiators’ duty to educate the members about bargaining conditions. See Hyde, supra 
note 144, at 794–95, 830, 845–47. He argues increased member participation will increase 
the likelihood members will comply with the agreements which they have ratified. Id. at 
830. But see Kroncke, supra note 119, at 643 (citation omitted) (noting little evidence 
supports the proposition that a lack of participation weakens high-performing unions). 
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“engage in democratic decision-making on a daily basis”153 gener-
ating “an inner public sphere” in the union that is akin to the liberal 
state.154 The benefits that inhere in union democracy likewise mirror 
those observed in democratic government: workers are free to asso-
ciate and to criticize their workplace, they become educated about 
their industry, including its requirements for production and its lim-
itations, and they develop individual responsibility to their organi-
zation that tempers extreme, idiosyncratic views.155 
As in democratic government, tensions exist when a union pur-
ports to speak for all workers, including members who dissent and 
those who are not members in the first instance.156 However, a un-
ion’s democratic legitimacy derives from workers’ ability to con-
tribute to formation of the group will, despite the presence of inter-
nal disagreement about particular aims.157 As such, these critiques 
do not undermine a union’s legitimacy, which rests on workers’ 
ability to participate. Rather, they caution that unionization’s demo-
cratic benefits require internal procedures that give voice to all union 
constituents.158 
Leadership accountability to members is crucial to a union’s 
democratic formation, lest union official hegemony replace em-
ployer hegemony. At base, union leaders are accountable to mem-
bers because members may vote them out of office. Union leaders 
are also, in general, more likely to be responsive to members’ inter-
ests when they align ideologically and take pride in their 
 
153 Kate Andrias, An American Approach to Social Democracy: The Forgotten Promise 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 128 YALE L.J. 616, 647 (2019) (citation omitted); 
Andrias, supra note 143, at 46–47. 
154 Levine, supra note 130, at 568; see also GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 38; PERLMAN, 
supra note 122, at 153 (quoting Joint Agreements, supra note 151, at 193–94) (“The 
workers are not only members of a democratic organization of their own for collective 
action in regard to the terms of employment, but citizens of a dual government for the 
industry as a whole in labor matters. They elect representatives to a joint legislative body; 
they participate directly or through their national officers in the selection of members of a 
joint judiciary which is in many cases also a joint executive with large powers of enforcing 
its decision.”); c.f. Kroncke, supra note 119, at 619. 
155 PERLMAN, supra note 122, at 152–53; Levine, supra note 130, at 568–69. 
156 Kroncke, supra note 119, at 654; Andrias, supra note 153, at 628; Levine, supra note 
130, at 545–46, 565. 
157 Hyde, supra note 144, at 794–95, 806–08, 832. 
158 Id. at 807–08. 
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advocacy.159 Finally, unions’ duty of fair representation, a fiduciary 
obligation imposed by law,160 keeps union leadership accountable to 
all constituents, including non-members, by requiring unions to rep-
resent fairly all constituents’ views when entering collective bar-
gaining.161 
Internal platform-democratic structures can draw from internal 
industrial-democratic structures, but they will have to diverge in cer-
tain respects to address the platform political economy and online 
social networks’ nuances. As in the labor context, a consumer col-
lective bargaining organization could gain democratic legitimacy 
through democratic formation, consumer participation in the organ-
ization’s formation and operations, and leadership accountability. 
Each of these features of internal industrial democracy will likely 
look substantially different in the platform context. 
As for labor organizing, consumer organizing can take a bottom-
up (“grassroots”) or top-down (“institutional”) approach. The online 
grassroots approach is bound to look fairly different than in the 
workplace, where workers are able to identify each other easily, pe-
tition each other directly, and organize a meeting among themselves 
to decide their demands and agree to strike if they are not met.162 By 
contrast, consumers’ abilities to directly identify, petition, and de-
liberate with one another are limited by the reach of their online so-
cial networks. The nested, overlapping structure of online social 
 
159 REES, supra note 128, at 174, 180; Thomas J. Campbell, Labor Law and Economics, 
38 STAN. L. REV. 991, 1013 (1986); Ashenfelter & Johnson, supra note 150, at 36. 
160 The duty of fair representation was developed by courts rather than statute. Campbell, 
supra note 159, at 1013 n.112 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 159(a); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 
335, 342 (1964)). 
161 Hyde, supra note 144, at 806; Andrias, supra note 143, at 24 (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 
386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967)); Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202–03 (1944); 
REES, supra note 128, at 29; see also Campbell, supra note 159, at 1013 (internal citations 
omitted). Unions’ fiduciary obligation to all workers in the unit is often attached to the 
workers’ obligation to pay dues, regardless of their membership in the union; though in 
some systems, unions’ obligation attains even though non-members are not required to pay. 
Andrias, supra note 143, at 24–25 (internal citation omitted). Alan Hyde describes in detail 
the procedural requirements courts have imposed on unions under the duty of fair 
representation, including the use of a “rational decision-making process” to ascertain 
worker interests and desires and an equitable procedure for protecting the interests of all 
workers in the event of intraunion conflict. Hyde, supra note 144, at 805–06. 
162 See REES, supra note 128, at 27. 
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networks163 suggest identification and petitioning may be possible 
iteratively—consumers can identify and petition those within their 
network and those who agree can identify and petition members of 
their other social groups. Online organizing efforts may spread 
broadly, rapidly, at low cost, and with little time investment. 
These vast interconnected networks are unlikely to “meet” to de-
cide collectively their demands in any proper sense. Rather, grass-
roots-turned-institutional movements such as Black Lives Matter164 
suggest anecdotally that a smaller group of highly motivated indi-
viduals may formulate and propose demands and lead the organizing 
effort. Consumers’ agreement to organize would be reflected in their 
public statement of solidarity. Consumer “deliberation” over the 
smaller group’s articulated demands may, at a minimum, involve 
consumers’ individual, public agreement or disagreement with the 
set of demands. They may also involve public-facing conversation 
(e.g., Facebook posts, Twitter tweets, or Reddit threads) about these 
demands that may lead to their revision.165 
The democratic operation of online grassroots organizing must 
also adapt to the Internet’s affordances and constraints. As noted, 
direct participation in articulating a set of demands may practically 
be limited to public-facing conversation. Likewise, consumers’ 
agreement to act collectively and to align on a set of demands—their 
“vote”—and their “election” of representatives may be limited to 
public affirmation of their solidarity with the smaller group’s artic-
ulated mission. There are, however, technologies that enable a more 
traditional type of deliberation and voting. Liquid Feedback is a 
software that allows users to start an “initiative,” disseminate it to 
others, receive others’ feedback, and allow them to vote on the ini-
tiative.166 
 
163 Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at 435 (citing Michal Kosinski, David Stillwell, & 
Thore Graepel, Private Traits and Attributes are Predictable from Digital Records of 
Human Behavior, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 5802, 5802 (2013)). 
164 Herstory, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/herstory/ 
[https://perma.cc/K36G-QH6D]. 
165 Schwartz, supra note 12, at 836 (noting the Internet is a forum for deliberative 
democracy). 
166 LIQUID FEEDBACK, https://liquidfeedback.org/ [https://perma.cc/7MHM-ENXZ]. 
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Leadership accountability is a particular challenge following the 
grassroots approach, as those who helm the grassroots effort may 
not be subject to “election” in a traditional sense. Rather, leaders’ 
accountability will likely depend heavily on a high degree of ideo-
logical alignment between them and the broader group of consumers 
whose interests are at stake. 
An institutional approach to consumer organizing for infor-
mation privacy may mirror labor organizing more closely. An insti-
tution already involved in privacy advocacy, much like a national 
labor union, may identify and petition consumers to join a collective 
bargaining organization, perhaps through advertising or by drawing 
on existing membership or donor lists. The institution could then 
implement labor-union-like internal democratic structures. Creating 
these structures may involve public deliberation through online fora, 
voting, and the election of representatives. It could create highly par-
ticipatory mechanisms, such as bottom-up formation of demands 
from its members’ deliberation and membership ratification of bar-
gaining agreements, or limit participation to the decision to join the 
institution’s collective bargaining organization. 
One group, called RadicalxChange, is currently attempting to 
organize people to pursue a number of  initiatives including one fo-
cused on “data dignity.”167 It also draws from a metaphor to labor 
and it intends to implement a range of internal democratic mecha-
nisms, such as voting on priorities and initiatives and deliberation 
through written comment.168 Such an organization could prove to be 
a formidable testing ground for consumer collectivization and would 
be a good fit to organize consumers for information privacy as well. 
Following either a grassroots or an institutional approach, a  
consumer collective bargaining organization’s constituent base will 
be characteristically different than in the labor context. Legally,  
labor union formation by voting requires the circumscription of a 
 
167 About RxC, RADICALXCHANGE, https://www.radicalxchange.org/about/ [https://per 
ma.cc/EMN7-7ATZ]; Data Dignity, RADICALXCHANGE, https://www.radicalxchange.org/ 
concepts/data-dignity/ [https://perma.cc/W686-FRE9]. 
168 THE DATA FREEDOM ACT 4–5, RADICALXCHANGE, https://www.radicalxchange. 
org/kiosk/papers/data-freedom-act.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UEW-PXQM]; Alex Randaccio, 
Introducing RxC Voice, RADICALXCHANGE (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.rad 
icalxchange.org/kiosk/blog/introducing-rxc-voice/ [https://perma.cc/HL7B-LBB5]. 
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sufficiently homogenous yet distinct bargaining unit and a majority 
vote in favor of formation.169 This requirement ensures unions rep-
resent their constituents fairly. In the platform setting, defining a 
“bargaining unit” would prove difficult and may be unnecessary. 
Whereas in the labor setting there were clear homogeneity markers 
such as job roles, superficial markers of consumer homogeneity 
(e.g., demographics, geographic location, and educational attain-
ment) may not correlate with information privacy norms.170 Even 
limiting the bargaining unit to a platform’s users in a particular 
country may prove problematic, as platforms’ collection and use of 
personal information extend beyond their user bases. However, in-
stead of attempting to define ex ante a bargaining unit, a consumer 
collective bargaining organization may limit its constituents to those 
who decide to join. Even if an organization limits its constituency in 
this manner, due to the social character of personal information 
online, it ought to adopt a “duty of fair representation” to represent 
the views of non-members affected by a platform’s information pri-
vacy rules, regardless whether those non-members use the platform. 
As in the labor context, platform democracy’s internal structures 
would ideally generate a public sphere that resembles the liberal 
state. Consumers would make collective decisions about their infor-
mation privacy and thereby engage in democratic decision-making. 
Consumers would likewise receive the benefits of democratic asso-
ciation: they would be able to criticize a platform, become educated 
about information privacy rules and how they are affected by them, 
develop a responsibility to their collective interest, and transcend 
idiosyncrasies to form shared norms. The organization would attain 
democratic legitimacy on the same grounds as a labor union.  
Regardless of dissent among those organized and the likelihood the 
organization’s information privacy demands, if granted, would  
affect non-members, the organization would be legitimate demo-
cratically due to consumers’ ability to contribute to the formation  
of group will. 
 
169 See supra notes 128–129. 
170 Posner, supra note 118, at 995. 
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2. Procedural Democracy 
Internal democracy would legitimate a collective bargaining or-
ganization as a political institution. Instituting a process that em-
powers workers to influence the terms and conditions of their labor 
would then legitimate workplace decision-making. Unions democ-
ratize the employer-worker relationship by accumulating worker 
bargaining power through collective action and then bargaining col-
lectively with employers, thereby serving as a counterforce to em-
ployer hegemony. Collective bargaining also reduces bargaining 
costs relative to individual employer-worker negotiations by chan-
neling otherwise diffuse worker demands on and commitments to 
the employer into streamlined, overarching conditions that would 
apply to all workers under the union’s purview.171 
Through unions, workers engage in “private self-help”: they 
channel worker voice into a set of streamlined and actionable de-
mands, contribute to a robust civil society in which private groups 
engage in public work,172 and shift power from employers to work-
ers in the workplace.173 Unions counteract the harms to human 
 
171 Moore, supra note 119, at 423; GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 15–16; see also Levine, 
supra note 130, at 538 (citation omitted). Moreover, unions’ ability to channel and formally 
communicate worker voice and grievances, discipline workers who attempt unauthorized 
strikes, and provide job security to workers, confers onto employers greater workplace 
stability and reduced labor strife. Campbell, supra note 159, at 996 (citation omitted); 
Posner, supra note 125, at 1000 (citation omitted); Tucker, supra note 126, at 114; c.f., 
Levine, supra note 130, at 540. Additionally, collective bargaining agreements may contain 
“no-strike” clauses that allow an employer to get an injunction and, potentially, monetary 
damages in the event of a union strike. Posner, supra note 118, at 999. 
172 Levine, supra note 130, at 558; Andrias, supra note 153, at 648–49. Democratic union 
governance as described fits what the late Professor Philip Selznick calls “the morality of 
cooperation,” which is supportive of the development of civil society. The morality of 
cooperation describes individuals as having commitments deriving from personal 
autonomy and group requirements, norms as arising from group experience, cognizant of 
individual and group differences, and focused on joint problem-solving through effective 
communication and openness to divergent views. Selznick, supra note 92, at 24–25; see 
also Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 93 (2016); PERLMAN, supra note 
122, at 152 (stating collective bargaining agreements also enable workers to influence the 
governance of their industry). 
173 Andrias, supra note 172, at 73, 76, 77; Levine, supra note 130, at 566–67 (noting 
unions overcome workers’ collective action problem by channeling worker voice, thereby 
contributing to a robust public debate to the benefit of the rest of society); Andrias, supra 
note 143, at 56. Arthur S. Miller, A Modest Proposal for Helping to Tame the Corporate 
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dignity174 caused by the “commodification of labor” (that is, the no-
tion that workers sell their labor, and employers buy that labor, for 
a price determined by the market)175 by facilitating the collective 
action of otherwise unempowered and disenfranchised workers.176 
“[U]nions differentiate laborers from their tools, because the tools 
remain commodities that belong to the firm, but the workers enjoy 
self-government through their union.”177 Unions resist commodifi-
cation and support workers’ freedom by protecting workers from 
abuse by their employers.178 
Consumer collective action, through an intermediating bargain-
ing organization, may democratize information privacy in much the 
same way. A vehicle to channel and articulate consumer voice and 
a mechanism for consumers to assert collective control would pro-
vide consumers a role in determining their information privacy 
norms and the rules that protect them, lending those rules demo-
cratic legitimacy. Collective bargaining, in this context, would re-
duce bargaining costs relative to the cost of (already unlikely) indi-
vidual consumer-platform negotiations by channeling consumers’ 
 
Beast, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 79, 85 (1979); Levine, supra note 130, at 544; Andrias, supra 
note 153, at 647 (citation omitted). 
174 Work is viewed as having a “special dignity” and value in that, through work, man 
achieves “fulfillment as a human being.” Levine, supra note 130, at 550–51 (quoting POPE 
JOHN PAUL II, LABOREM EXERCENS (Sept. 14, 1981), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-
ii_enc_14091981_laborem-exercens.html [https://perma.cc/4FMP-XB5H]; see also 
Spector, supra note 118, at 1137 (quoting Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1894 (1987)). Commodification of labor reduces the human being to 
an economic transaction, an “object outside us.” Garcia, supra note 139, at 33 (citation 
omitted); E. Christi Cunningham, Identity Markets, 45 HOW. L.J. 491, 498–99, 501 (2002) 
(describing commodification of labor as workers’ alienation from the “meaningfulness” of 
their labor). 
175 GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 31; Levine, supra note 130, at 550 (citation omitted); 
Garcia, supra note 139, at 27 (citing Karl Marx, Capital, Volume One, in THE MARX-
ENGELS READER 191, 308–19 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978)). 
176 Spector, supra note 118, at 1137 (quoting Radin, supra note 174, at 1919); Tucker, 
supra note 126, at 106, 109 (describing the harm to human dignity caused by the 
commodification of labor and Marxian views that labor can overcome commodification 
through collective action); GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 57; Levine, supra note 130, at 
551. 
177 Levine, supra note 130, at 551. 
178 See REES, supra note 128, at 182; Garcia, supra note 139, at 33–34, 36 (internal 
citations omitted). 
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information privacy demands into an overarching set that would ap-
ply to all consumers represented by the organization. Moreover, the 
bargaining process may further educate consumers on how plat-
forms’ practices affect their information privacy insofar as it is in-
formation-forcing: to achieve a mutually agreeable solution, the 
platform will have to share more information about its data-handling 
practices and the collective bargaining organization will have to 
share information about consumers’ values and desired protections. 
Democratizing information privacy through a consumer collec-
tive bargaining organization would also ameliorate the harms to hu-
man dignity caused by the commodification of personal infor-
mation.179 Much like a labor union, which de-commodifies labor by 
allowing workers to decide the terms of their labor, a vehicle for 
consumer collective autonomy over information privacy de-com-
modifies personal information by returning power over the privacy 
of that information to consumers. Moreover, whereas individual 
consumers lack the power to bargain for their information privacy 
with platforms, a consumer collective bargaining organization 
would accumulate bargaining power by making collective demands 
and threats that may affect a platform’s revenue. 
Unions democratize workplace decision-making through collec-
tive bargaining, i.e., private negotiations between a union (as a rep-
resentative of its constituent workers) and an employer to obtain 
 
179 On the commodification of personal information, see Hetcher, supra note 18, at 130 
(citation omitted); Baron, supra note 38, at 391; de Hingh, supra note 14, at 1270, 1272, 
1278, 1284; Opinion 4/2015, supra note 14, at 11 (citation omitted); Savage, supra note 
24, at 98; Schwartz, supra note 27, at 2057 (citation omitted); Schwartz, supra note 28, at 
1282; Elvy, supra note 14, at 463–64, 466 (citations omitted); Bergelson, supra note 20, at 
403–04 (citations omitted). On the dignitary harms of the commodification of personal 
information and privacy, see Barnhizer, supra note 13, at 70, 72–73 (citations omitted); 
Calo, supra note 9, at 662; Baron, supra note 38, at 390–91, 393–96, 398–400 (citations 
omitted); de Hingh, supra note 14, at 1271–73, 1275–76, 1278, 1281, 1286–87 (citations 
omitted); Meg Leta Jones, The Right to a Human in the Loop: Political Constructions of 
Computer Automation and Personhood, 47 SOC. STUD. SCI. 217, 218–19 (2017); Radin & 
Wagner, supra note 91, at 1312 (citations omitted); Savage, supra note 24, at 109 (citation 
omitted); Post, supra note 70, at 662–63, 667–70 (citations omitted); Opinion 4/2015, 
supra note 14, at 4, 12 (citations omitted); see also generally Radin, supra note 174; 
Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin’s Theory of Property 
and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347 (1993); Cunningham, supra note 174. 
2021] DEMOCRATIZING PLATFORM PRIVACY 839 
 
employer concessions to wage and working condition demands.180 
The union typically initiates bargaining; whereas the employer may 
be satisfied with the status quo, the union seeks employer conces-
sions that would benefit its members.181 A union’s prospect of suc-
cess depends on its bargaining power against an employer.182 Bar-
gaining power, in turn, derives from a number of interrelated factors: 
strike, organization size, constituent cohesion, counterparty re-
sistance, product market structure, and external conditions, such as 
public opinion, the state of the economy, and governmental action. 
Collective bargaining may also democratize platform infor-
mation privacy decision-making: a consumer collective bargaining 
organization could bargain with platforms, on behalf of the organi-
zation’s consumer-constituents, to obtain platforms’ assent to a set 
of demanded information privacy protections. The factors affecting 
labor union bargaining power provide a starting point to analogize 
how a consumer collective bargaining organization may accumulate 
bargaining power. Each of these factors, however, must be adapted 
to reflect platforms’ distinct economic and structural characteristics. 
How much bargaining power will be necessary to countervail plat-
form power is inherently uncertain; the bargaining process will have 
to bear it out. 
a) Strike/Mass Exit and Secondary Boycott 
The strike, and the threat of strike, is the chief source of union 
bargaining power.183 Through a strike, the union imposes costs on 
the employer by restricting labor supply and keeping resources 
idle.184 The lack of production strains the employer by limiting its 
ability to cover at least some of its fixed costs and satisfy sale orders, 
which can cause the employer to lose customers.185 A threatened 
strike may also reduce bargaining costs if its potential effect on 
 
180 REES, supra note 128, at 28. 
181 Id. at 30. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 31. 
184 Id. at 32. 
185 Id. at 35. 
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profits forces each side to reveal information to avoid a strike and 
its costs.186 
In the platform context, a “strike” becomes a mass exit: platform 
users would abstain from a platform until it accedes to their infor-
mation privacy demands, thereby impairing the platform’s access to 
those users’ personal information. Mass exit, unlike a labor strike, 
also has characteristics of a boycott—abstention from a platform 
also entails decreased consumption of behavioral advertising on the 
platform. 
In theory, mass exit would impair the supply of personal infor-
mation to platforms and thereby impede their behavioral algo-
rithms.187 By acting in concert, platform users would also reduce 
their substitutability as sources of personal information—recall, 
much of consumers’ personal information need not be supplied by a 
consumer herself, because it can be obtained from third-party 
sources, including socially or demographically proximate consum-
ers. 
In practice, however, mass exit encounters a number of difficul-
ties. First, the continued availability of other third-party sources will 
make it difficult for consumers, regardless whether they use a plat-
form, to obstruct the flow of their personal information to the plat-
form.188 Google and Facebook, for example, obtain streams of per-
sonal information from myriad third-party websites and applications 
through plug-ins, cookies, and other tracking tools.189  
Consumers would have to, first, know what websites embed 
these trackers and, second, abstain from these websites as well to 
truly restrict these platforms’ access to their personal information. 
And, if a platform offers multiple consumer products (e.g., Google’s 
Search, Maps, Gmail, Photos, etc.), its users would ostensibly have 
to abstain from all of the platform’s products to affect their supply 
 
186 See MARTIN, supra note 150, at 86; Ashenfelter & Johnson, supra note 150, at 36; 
REES, supra note 128, at 34. To a certain extent, unions must actually deploy strikes on 
occasion to retain the threat of strike as an effective bargaining chit. Id. 
187 Cf. JARON LANIER, TEN ARGUMENTS FOR DELETING YOUR SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS 
RIGHT NOW 104 (2018); Ibarra et al., supra note 9, at 2.  
188 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
189 Id. 
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of personal information to it.190 Moreover, if a platform already has 
comprehensive behavioral profiles about consumers, it may not 
need additional personal information to continue to target behavioral 
advertisements. 
Second, mass exit’s boycott characteristics support only par-
tially its potential efficacy. The platform would incur a cost from 
decreased advertising consumption, but mass exit only entails a 
“boycott” of advertising appearing on the platform. For platforms 
such as Facebook and Google, whose advertisements also appear on 
innumerable third-party websites,191 on-platform advertising may 
prove to be a relatively small revenue steam. Hence, regardless of 
consumers’ abstinence from the platforms, they may nevertheless 
continue consuming the platforms’ advertising on third-party web-
sites. 
Third, it may be difficult for users to abstain from a platform 
whose consumer product (i.e., Facebook’s online social network192; 
Amazon’s e-commerce hub193; and Google’s search engine194) is 
ubiquitous. Abstention would impair users’ social and economic 
lives, however temporarily. The network effect that props up online 
social networks may potentially abate the cost to abstain from them: 
if a user’s social circles agree to exit the platform for a period of 
time, the individual user faces a lower social cost than she would by 
exiting individually because the social network service becomes less 
valuable to her during that time. For e-commerce and search engine 
platforms, a collective bargaining organization would likely need to 
 
190 Browse All of Google’s Products and Services, GOOGLE, https://about.google/ 
intl/en_us/products/ [https://perma.cc/T4B4-STXE]. 
191 Introducing Facebook’s Audience Network, FACEBOOK FOR BUS. (Apr. 30, 2014), 
https://www.facebook.com/business/news/audience-network [https://perma.cc/K7PX-87 
ST]; Google AdSense, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/adsense/start/ [https://perma.cc/ 
7L38-L9SX?type=image]. 
192 FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ [https://perma.cc/KF9T-Y8ZF]. 
193 AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/ [https://perma.cc/8CFT-LDPH]. 
194 GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/ [https://perma.cc/L8KQ-2ARS]. 
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educate consumers about alternatives, such as DuckDuckGo195  
relative to Google Search.196 
Mass exit may not be especially powerful for a consumer collec-
tive bargaining organization, but the prospect of secondary boycott 
offers some promise. For labor unions, a secondary boycott typically 
entails a union’s coercion of an employer’s business partner to stop 
doing business with the employer or encouragement of the business 
partner’s employees to strike, so as to exert indirect pressure on the 
employer.197 Labor law prohibits this conduct, but permits unions to 
exert indirect pressure on employers by attempting to persuade their 
partners to cease business with them.198 
The permissible form of secondary boycott translates well to the 
platform context: a consumer collective bargaining organization 
may call on advertisers to cease doing business with a platform until 
it meets consumers’ information privacy demands. An advertising 
boycott would likely directly affect platform profits, which are often 
heavily derived from advertising sales. Whether this source of pres-
sure compels a platform to bargain with a private advocacy organi-
zation is currently being tested—as of the time of this writing, 800 
companies have pulled millions of dollars from advertising on  
Facebook, demanding that the platform monitor hate speech more 
aggressively.199 A coalition of civil rights groups and other advo-
cacy organizations, under the banner of “Stop Hate For Profit,” 
mounted the campaign by lobbying corporate leaders and shaming 
a number of companies on social media.200 The Stop Hate For Profit 
coalition has demanded that Facebook make a number of changes to 
 
195 DUCKDUCKGO, https://duckduckgo.com/ [https://perma.cc/W2VJ-YXX2]. 
196 Organizations such as Restore Privacy compile lists of privacy friendly alternatives to 
large platforms. See Sven Taylor, Alternatives to Google Products for 2021, RESTORE 
PRIVACY (Jan. 6, 2021), https://restoreprivacy.com/google-alternatives/ [https://perma.cc/ 
EY2X-G2MV]. 




199 Nancy Scola, Inside the Ad Boycott That Has Facebook on the Defensive, POLITICO 
(July 3, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/07/03/activists-advert 
ising-boycott-facebook-348528?cid=apn [https://perma.cc/QMM5-ER42]. 
200 Id. 
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its internal practices regarding hate speech on its platform. Their de-
mands include accountability measures (e.g., an internal audit of 
identity-based hate and misinformation), decency measures (e.g., 
finding and removing public and private hate groups from the plat-
form), and support measures (e.g.,  enabling users to report hate and 
harassment).201 Months into the campaign, Facebook agreed to cre-
ate a new senior executive role focused on civil rights, participated 
in an audit of hateful content on the platform, took down a variety 
of hateful content, and began to revise its algorithm to address sys-
temic bias. 202 Stop Hate for Profit’s successes demonstrate that ad-
vertisers’ purchasing power can sometimes augment consumers’ 
bargaining power relative to platforms.  
b) Organization Size 
A larger union may have greater bargaining power than a smaller 
union for a number of reasons. 203  The ability to control labor supply 
to an employer confers a significant bargaining advantage on the 
union, which may withhold labor unless an employer agrees to a 
wage increase.204 A larger union also has a broader fee-paying mem-
bership and thus is able to sustain its operations.205 A smaller union, 
by contrast, poses less of a threat to an employer because its strike 
 
201 Recommended Next Steps, STOP HATE FOR PROFIT, https://www.stophateforprofit.org/ 
productrecommendations [https://perma.cc/USN9-S32V]. 
202 Brakkton Booker, Facebook Taps Former Obama Official As Vice President Of Civil 
Rights, NPR (Jan 11, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/01/11/955750196/facebook-taps-
former-obama-official-as-vice-president-of-civil-civil-rights [https://perma.cc/9GED-38 
4V]. 
203 GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 33, 35. 
204 Campbell, supra note 159, at 1016. This can be explained in economic terms as 
reducing the elasticity of labor demand. REES, supra note 128, at 70. By unionizing the 
entire workforce, a union can reduce the substitutability of non-union labor for union labor, 
and thereby reduce the employer’s sensitivity to wage increases. Id. at 70–71; Campbell, 
supra note 159, at 1007, 1015–16, 1018 (citation omitted). 
205 Preliminary organization, the provision of participatory procedures, and the hiring of 
union officers and negotiators, among other things, all require ongoing funding. See 
Andrias, supra note 172, at 93–96 (citation omitted). Typically, unions support themselves 
through member dues payments and, in some jurisdictions, dues payments from all 
constituent workers regardless of their membership in the union. Id. at 93–96 (citation 
omitted). Under this financing structure, increased funding flows from a larger number of 
members or dues-payers or, potentially, from fee increases following successful wage 
hikes. 
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may not significantly increase production costs and it has a smaller 
membership from which it collects fees.206 
Larger unions, however, have certain disadvantages that may 
impede their functioning. First, a larger union is more likely to have 
members whose wage, hour, benefit, and workplace-condition pref-
erences diverge, thereby impairing the union’s ability to foster co-
hesion around a common plan of action.207 Second, the larger the 
union, the greater the cost to organize in the first instance.208 Third, 
large groups face greater difficulty overcoming collective action 
problems than smaller groups do, in part because each individual’s 
contribution to (and defection from) a large group is less percepti-
ble.209 
Large groups have certain mechanisms to overcome these diffi-
culties, such as pursuing core, unifying goals, leveraging an organi-
zation already in existence to provide the collective good, “federat-
ing” such that the large group is composed of many small groups in 
which individuals more easily hold one another accountable, and 
providing outside inducements to group members’ participation and 
compliance.210 Leveraging an existing organization, such as a na-
tional union, allows a particular workplace’s union to form without 
incurring large up-front fixed costs. Federation, in turn, improves 
accountability because individuals may more easily identify one an-
other, police compliance with group actions, and pressure their peers 
to comply.211 Outside inducements, including individuated pressure, 
may be positive or negative—for example, group members may os-
tracize or humiliate strikebreakers and reward those who comply 
with camaraderie and friendship.212 Inducements may also be 
 
206 Andrias, supra note 172, at 98; Posner, supra note 118, at 1008. 
207 Posner, supra note 118, at 1008; Campbell, supra note 159, at 1016; OLSON, supra 
note 129, at 46, 59–60 (describing a lack of consensus as “inimical to the prospects for 
group action and group cohesion”). 
208 Posner, supra note 118, at 1008; OLSON, supra note 129, at 47–48. 
209 OLSON, supra note 129, at 28, 44–45. But see Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at 
441–43 (describing experimental studies which did not support the hypothesis that larger 
groups are worse at producing public goods and instead suggested they may be more 
efficient than smaller groups). 
210 OLSON, supra note 129, at 44–48, 62–63, 74; GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 33. 
211 OLSON, supra note 129, at 60, 62–63. 
212 See generally id. at 51, 61. 
2021] DEMOCRATIZING PLATFORM PRIVACY 845 
 
economic, such as insurance and welfare benefits.213 In sum, larger 
unions that employ mechanisms to counteract their potential disad-
vantages have greater bargaining power than smaller unions that 
present employers with a less onerous risk of a strike. 
Likewise, for a consumer collective bargaining organization, 
large size would confer a certain advantage. Mass exit of the organ-
ization’s constituents would impose greater costs on the platform214 
and calls for advertisers to engage in a boycott may be more influ-
ential.  Large size would, however, hinder constituents from delib-
erating in a traditional manner—it is difficult to imagine how thou-
sands of consumers could engage in a productive and intelligible 
conversation about their information privacy. Hence the advantage 
of large size comes with a tradeoff; a consumer collective bargaining 
organization would likely have to employ less participatory mecha-
nisms, such as soliciting feedback to a pre-determined set of infor-
mation privacy demands. 
The organization may encounter difficulty in obtaining a large 
constituent base for a few reasons. Whereas workers may have a 
basic understanding that they are underpaid or their working condi-
tions are sub-par, consumers largely have only a diffuse notion of 
their information privacy harms. Those who helm the organizing ef-
fort would have to educate consumers about how platforms’ prac-
tices affect their information privacy to convince consumers to join. 
Additionally, if consumers have highly idiosyncratic and conflicting 
information privacy preferences, it will be difficult for a large or-
ganization to cohere around a set of information privacy demands. 
Discussed in greater detail below, an organization can work around 
this constraint by limiting its representation to a community that al-
ready aligns on a set of information privacy demands or by articu-
lating bargaining demands that are faithful to diverse consumers’ 
core, unifying goals. 
 
213 Id. at 72–73. 
214 See Spencer, supra note 13, at 901 (citation omitted). As for the effect of large size 
on labor unions, a large consumer collective bargaining organization can reduce the 
elasticity of demand for personal information by reducing the substitutability of one 
consumer’s personal information for another’s. Large-scale collective bargaining would 
impede the platform’s ability to obtain one consumer’s data from third parties to the extent 
those third parties participate in the collective bargaining. 
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The grassroots approach has certain benefits with respect to its 
ability to amass a large number of constituents. Grassroots organiz-
ing would be relatively low cost because it presupposes that a 
smaller, highly motivated group would articulate a set of infor-
mation privacy demands (that is, bear the upfront fixed costs) to 
which other consumers would sign on.215 The organizers would rely 
on consumers to express publicly their solidarity and petition their 
social circles to join. Online social networks’ “federated” quality 
support the prospect that such an organizing effort could obtain a 
large constituent base.216 Consumers online are not “an undifferen-
tiated mass of strangers, but rather [are in] nested smaller groups 
with higher frequencies of repeat play”217  and overlapping connec-
tions across groups.218 Within these small groups, reputational in-
centives (or sanctions) to motivate cooperation are more salient: in-
dividuals are mutually identifiable, their compliance is observable, 
and reputational repercussions are direct.219 Moreover, online social 
networks allow consumers to form and maintain social relationships 
despite geographic dispersion.220 This social structure supports both 
the emergence of a consumer collective bargaining organization and 
the effectiveness of its call for mass exit or secondary boycott be-
cause small groups may provide direct inducements, through indi-
vidualized reputational incentives, to support the organization’s for-
mation and compliance with calls for exit.221 
An institutional approach likewise has certain advantages to ac-
cumulating constituents. A preexisting institution, unlike a 
 
215 See Jack M. Balkin, The First Amendment Is an Information Policy, 41 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1, 2, 11, 13 (2012). 
216 Strandburg, supra note 22, at 1248; Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at 391. 
217 Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at 435 (citing Kosinski et al., supra note 163,  
at 5802), 438, 441–42 (citation omitted). Repeat interaction among group members 
supports compliance with collective goals by amplifying reputational repercussions around 
compliance. Strandburg, supra note 22, at 1248, 1283; Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14,  
at 438. 
218 Hetcher, supra note 18, at 121. 
219 Id.; Strandburg supra note 22, at 1248; Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at 396, 448, 
450–52 (citation omitted). 
220 Hetcher, supra note 18, at 120–21. 
221 See Strandburg, supra note 22, at 1283, 1284 (citation omitted); Ozer, supra note 15, 
at 272–73 (citation omitted); Fairfield & Engel, supra note 14, at 448, 451–53 (citation 
omitted); Calo, supra note 9, at 678. 
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grassroots movement, may rely on existing sources of public and 
private funding to support its effort to organize consumers.222 Addi-
tionally, such an institution may already have members or donors 
who would be particularly interested to participate in and grow a 
collective bargaining organization. And, as for the grassroots ap-
proach, online social networks may support an organization’s far-
ther reach. 
c) Constituent Cohesion 
A union seeks employer concessions to a set of common de-
mands, but workers may individually hold idiosyncratic or opposing 
views on what goals the union ought to pursue.223 Goal heterogene-
ity may not efface a union’s democratic legitimacy as long as all 
constituents are able to participate in the discourse that informs un-
ion decision-making, but it can lead to the formation of de-stabiliz-
ing factions.224 The formation of factions within a union worsens a 
union’s bargaining position by placing the union’s continued exist-
ence in peril.225 By contrast, solidarity among union members con-
tributes to the union’s bargaining strength by streamlining bargain-
ing demands and allowing for more effective implementation of 
strikes and threats to strike.226 A union is able to increase its mem-
bers’ solidarity by pursuing workers’ core, unifying goals,227 disci-
plining members for shirking from strikes or engaging in 
 
222 These organizations already receive public and private financial support, from 
government grants, cy pres funds, foundations, and individual contributors. Ozer, supra 
note 15, at 250–51 (citations omitted). Of course, branching out to consumer collective 
bargaining will entail additional costs for an organization that would take up the cause, 
which would require either additional support from existing funding sources or allocating 
existing funding to this new endeavor. 
223 See REES, supra note 128, at 180. 
224 Id. at 178. 
225 See Andrias, supra note 172, at 30; REES, supra note 128, at 178–79. Intra-union 
factions are typically unstable and end in either the defeat and disappearance of a faction, 
or the split of the union into two organizations. Healthy union functioning does not require 
members or leaders to be in unanimous agreement—a union may have a sustainable (and 
vibrant) two-party system or disagreeing members may nevertheless support the union 
because of other benefits it provides. REES, supra note 128, at 178. 
226 See also GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 15, 32–33. 
227 PERLMAN, supra note 122, at 202 (quoting A THEORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT, 
supra note 122, at 276–77); see also GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 15. 
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unauthorized strikes,228 and imposing exit costs on members (such 
as rescinding voting rights and access to grievance procedures).229 
Moreover, a union’s past success may inspire member loyalty that 
further strengthens the union.230 
No doubt consumers may hold idiosyncratic or conflicting pref-
erences with respect to their information privacy. These idiosyncra-
sies would likewise destabilize consumer collective bargaining by 
hindering a single organization’s ability to, first, channel consum-
ers’ views into demands for protection that would apply to all con-
sumers under the organization’s purview and, second, motivate con-
sumers to participate in a mass exit or call for a secondary boycott 
if the organization’s demands are not met. Moreover, multiple or-
ganizations that each represent a subset of consumers holding par-
ticular views may make mutually antithetical demands. 
A consumer collective bargaining organization has a number of 
tools to encourage solidarity despite the potential for idiosyncrasy. 
The organization may limit its representation to those who already 
align on a set of information privacy protections. This approach has 
certain benefits and drawbacks. It would ensure the organization 
faithfully represents its constituents and encourages constituent-
consumers to participate in a mass exit or a call for a secondary boy-
cott. It would also limit the number of constituents, potentially to 
the point where their collective action would not pose a significant 
threat. Alternatively, the organization can limit its bargaining de-
mands so that they are faithful to constituents’ information privacy 
norms and responsive to their core goals instead of their granular, 
idiosyncratic preferences. This approach will likely favor standards 
over rules, so as to align with community norms, and may involve a 
general allocation of responsibility, such as requiring the platform 
to act as a fiduciary of the organization’s constituents.231 The organ-
ization can also foment solidarity through social sanctions, such as 
encouraging consumers to reward their social circles with 
 
228 See Kroncke, supra note 119, at 621, 634, 642. 
229 Levine, supra note 130, at 559; Johnsen, supra note 132, at 207. 
230 See REES, supra note 128, at 30; Kroncke, supra note 119, at 643 (citation omitted). 
231 See Balkin, supra note 35. 
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camaraderie for joining the organization and participating in its ac-
tions or by punishing defectors with ostracization or humiliation. 
d) Counterparty Resistance 
Labor collective bargaining is characteristically antagonistic. 
Employers are expected to meet demands for higher wages or im-
proved working conditions with resistance.232 Intense employer op-
position to a union’s formation may increase the costs of forming it 
and thereby impede unionization.233 An employer may increase 
costs for a union by limiting the mechanisms or venues through 
which it can reach workers, such as by preventing union leafletting 
in a factory or prohibiting workers from engaging in union-related 
activities on employer Internet networks or email services. 
Platforms’ ability to impede consumer organization is of a mag-
nitude more profound and pernicious than employers’ power over 
workers.234 Facebook could block collective bargaining content or 
bury it in a user’s Newsfeed. Google could demote search engine 
results related to the effort or throttle Gmail traffic to organizers. 
But, beyond occluding information relevant to consumer organiz-
ing, these platforms may have the unique ability to actively manip-
ulate consumer information privacy norms and consumer thought 
about acting collectively for their information privacy.235 A con-
sumer collective bargaining organization could provide some work-
arounds, for instance, by providing a webpage on which consumers 
may engage but these platforms cannot impose constraints. It can 
also educate consumers on alternative venues through which they 
can coordinate and discuss, such as Signal236 or Reddit.237 
 
232 MARTIN, supra note 150, at 86. However, when the cost of union labor is small relative 
to the total cost of production, demand for union labor is less elastic, such that an employer 
would not face significant profit loss from a wage increase. REES, supra note 128, at 70, 
72. See also Posner, supra note 125, at 1002. 
233 Andrias, supra note 172, at 30; GAIL MCCALLION, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 93-759E, 
UNION MEMBERSHIP DECLINE: COMPETING THEORIES AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 5–7 
(1993). 
234 Regan, supra note 39, at 58–59 (citation omitted) (noting the architecture of platforms 
shape how groups may form and the rules around their engagement). 
235 See generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, supra note 12. 
236 SIGNAL, https://signal.org/en/ [https://perma.cc/W5N9-L8AU]. 
237 REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/ [https://perma.cc/6EVJ-H8G2]. 
850 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:792 
 
Notwithstanding platforms’ ability to impede their consumers’ 
organization, their incentive to do so is debatable. Platforms will in-
cur costs to provide consumers with greater information privacy 
protections, both to develop relevant technological solutions and to 
abstain from collecting and using personal information in certain 
ways.238 Nevertheless, they may decide that it is in their interest to 
allow consumers to organize and to bargain with that consumer or-
ganization. First, a platform may want to support its consumers’ in-
formation privacy norms and provide their demanded protections 
but find it both difficult and costly to do so because it cannot easily 
obtain the relevant information from unorganized consumers. A col-
lective bargaining organization would streamline relevant infor-
mation gathering by channeling consumers’ demands and represent-
ing a body of consumers, thereby reducing the platform’s costs to 
satisfy these consumers. Second, platforms such as Facebook and 
Google pride themselves on being pro-speech and encouraging civic 
engagement. These platforms may abstain from interfering with 
consumers’ organization to effectuate these contended values and 
boost their public image. Third, regardless of whether a platform is 
motivated by altruism or its public image, entering a collective bar-
gaining agreement with consumers may reduce the platform’s risk 
of FTC enforcement. A successful collective bargaining agreement 
would be a true instantiation of consumer autonomy because its in-
formation privacy protections would not be dictated by the platform. 
e) Product Market Structure 
Some economists contend a union is able to achieve greater 
gains when the employer with whom it bargains is a monopolist in 
its product market.239 This is due to the union’s ability to “capture” 
some of the employer’s monopoly profits, as opposed to attempting 
 
238 See ZUBOFF, supra note 12. Zuboff contends surveillance capitalists depend on the 
unobstructed ability to collect and use personal information. 
239 REES, supra note 128, at 82–83; Posner, supra note 125, at 1002. An employer’s 
demand for labor is less elastic (such that the employer is more likely to tolerate a wage 
increase) when demand for the employer’s final product is less elastic (i.e., consumer 
demand for the product is not sensitive to a small increase in price). REES, supra note 128, 
at 70–71; Campbell, supra note 159, at 1007–08, 1034. Product demand is typically 
inelastic where there is no good substitute for the product, as when the employer has a 
monopoly in that product market. See REES, supra note 128, at 71. 
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to force an employer in a competitive product market to pass on 
higher wages entirely through higher product prices, which would 
make it uncompetitive.240 A profit-maximizing monopoly, by con-
trast, may instead partially internalize the increased labor cost in the 
form of lower monopoly profits, rather than pass on the full cost 
increase to customers.241 
Consumer collective demands for information privacy protec-
tions will involve some costs for platforms, including lost revenue 
from untapped uses of personal information, constraints on their in-
formation sharing, or personal information left unacquired. For plat-
forms that operate in competitive product markets, these costs may 
make them uncompetitive by, for instance, requiring them to charge 
consumers for the product while their competitors are able to supply 
the product for “free.” A consumer collective bargaining organiza-
tion will likely have greater bargaining power when negotiating 
against platforms that monopolize their consumer product markets. 
Unlike competitive platforms, a monopolist platform may be able to 
internalize information privacy protection costs by reducing its prof-
its, but still remain profitable generally. Alternatively, a consumer 
collective bargaining organization may have greater bargaining 
power against a platform with market power in the advertising in-
dustry, which may be able to pass these costs on to advertisers who 
already pay a fee for the platform’s advertising services.242 
 
240 REES, supra note 128, at 82–85; Campbell, supra note 159, at 995, 998; cf. Spector, 
supra note 118, at 1132. See also Johnsen, supra note 132, at 196. But see REES, supra 
note 128, at 84 (arguing that studies showing higher wages won against monopolists may 
be of limited explanatory value because unions have also been successful against firms in 
competitive industries and less successful unions tend to be in declining or only partially 
organized industries). 
241 REES, supra note 128, at 85–86. Moreover, in markets where product demand exceeds 
supply at the current price, the firm may increase product price, while satisfying consumer 
demand (i.e., clear market) without suffering any profit loss. See id. at 87. 
242 If advertisers have no good substitute for the platform’s advertising product—that is, 
their demand for advertising services is inelastic—they may take on that additional cost. 
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f) External Conditions. 
A few conditions external to the union/employer relationship 
also affect a union’s relative bargaining success.243 First, public 
opinion in favor of the union, including in the form of a consumer 
boycott of the employer’s product, can buoy a union’s bargaining 
power by making the union’s demands seem less unreasonable.244 A 
union also achieves greater success in times of sustained economic 
growth, in part due to an employer’s ability to provide higher wages 
while maintaining high profit.245 By contrast, an overall shift from 
production to less unionized non-production jobs and the erosion of 
traditionally unionized industries has contributed to unions’ de-
cline.246 Finally, government involvement and the promulgation and 
 
243 Despite the benefits of unionization, in recent years, union membership has been on 
the decline. Labor scholars attribute the decline largely to external factors including the 
“fissured workplace” (i.e., the increase in independent contractor as opposed to employee 
jobs, subcontracting, and otherwise outsourcing labor), globalization, oppressive or weak 
labor laws, and employer opposition to organizing. Kroncke, supra note 119, at 638 
(citation omitted); Andrias, supra note 143, at 22 (citation omitted); Andrias, supra note 
172, at 20, 22, 23, 30. However, there may be a resurgence of worker organization on the 
horizon: Professor Kate Andrias describes in detail a few emerging worker movements that 
break from convention and seek to bargain with employers despite the lack of legal 
recognition and traditional organizational structures. Id. at 8, 58, 62, 68 (citation omitted). 
These movements blend traditional and innovative techniques, such as strikes, protests, 
organizing via social media, and providing workers educational materials through 
websites, to bargain for higher wages and seek the passage of beneficial legislation. Id. at 
8, 46–47, 49–51, 63, 68 (citation omitted). They do not abandon the core project of 
unionization—to influence workplace conditions through a collective bargaining 
agreement—but instead seek to strengthen it by bringing more diffuse workers and political 
actors into the process. Id. at 63, 69. 
244 GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 59; see REES, supra note 128, at 3, 42–43; MCCALLION, 
supra note 233, at CRS 5–6. 
245 Miller, supra note 173, at 85; GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 32; MCCALLION, supra 
note 233, at CRS 3–5 (internal citations omitted). But see id. at CRS 4 (noting increase 
worker affluence may make unions less desirable to workers). By contrast, periods of 
recession are marked by union job loss, hampering unions’ ability to organize. Id. at CRS 
5. This assumes employers are not in a perfectly competitive product market; in perfect 
competition, employers will earn only zero profit even in the presence of sustained 
economic growth. 
246 MCCALLION, supra note 233, at CRS 4, 8. 
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enforcement of laws that either support or constrain the union can 
play a significant role in a union’s ability to bargain successfully.247 
A consumer collective bargaining organization may likewise 
benefit from some of these external conditions. First, recent public 
opinion polling suggests a majority of platform users perceive harms 
to their information privacy.248 A consumer collective bargaining 
organization, whether grassroots or institutional, could appeal to 
these users to promote the benefits of collective action. Second, de-
spite the country’s current economic uncertainty, platforms continue 
to experience economic growth, supporting their ability to incur the 
additional costs attendant to greater information privacy protections 
while maintaining high profits.249 Third, whereas a shift from pro-
duction to non-production jobs contributed to the decline of labor 
unions, the data trade continues to proliferate, such that the value of 
personal information to platforms is unlikely to peter out in the fore-
seeable future. Finally, consumers’ collective bargaining to protect 
their information privacy is neither supported nor constrained by ex-
isting law or other government involvement; a consumer collective 
bargaining organization would not be subject to the laws regulating 
labor unions and is otherwise not regulated by statute. New laws 
could certainly support consumer collective action for information 
privacy. For instance, in the labor context, laws require employers 
both to allow union formation and to bargain with the union once 
formed. Similar laws could support a consumer collective bargain-
ing organization’s formation and bargaining efficacy. Congress’s 
stand-still on consumer privacy legislation, however, suggests such 
legal support is unlikely. 
 
247 See id. at CRS 5; Andrias, supra note 156, at 685, 698. Some labor laws support union 
bargaining power. For example, employers are required to meet union representatives, put 
any bargaining agreement in writing and, though not required to make concessions, 
employers must negotiate beyond refusing all union demands. REES, supra note 128, at 29. 
Other labor laws, such as laws allowing workers to exit from unions and refrain from 
paying dues, constrain union formation and thereby limit the union’s bargaining power. 
Andrias, supra note 156, at 685. Additionally, federal government regulation of unionized 
industries, for example, that allow employers to sustain high profits in turn allow employers 
to accede to higher wage demands without significant detriment to the firm. By contrast, 
industry deregulation may lead to union job losses. MCCALLION, supra note 233, at CRS 
5. 
248 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 39, at 2. 
249 See supra note 133. 
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3. Relational Contract 
Bargaining democracy is an essential component of industrial 
democracy, insofar as it enables worker voice and influence over the 
terms of their labor to countervail employer bargaining power. A 
collective bargaining agreement consummates democratic bargain-
ing. Labor unions’ ultimate marker of success is an increase in 
wages and the improvement of working conditions enforceable 
against employers through collective bargaining agreements.250 By 
entering such an agreement, a union is able to formalize and en-
trench a relationship of accountability and trust between workers 
and their employer.251 The collective bargaining agreement solidi-
fies the employer’s accountability to its workers by encouraging the 
employer to factor worker welfare into its workplace decision-mak-
ing.252 Employer accountability benefits the employer, as well, be-
cause it engenders trust from workers and encourages their general 
compliance with an employer’s unilateral workplace decisions.253 
Collective bargaining agreements support an ongoing demo-
cratic relationship between an employer and workers.  They are a 
species of relational contract that contain both contract-like and fi-
duciary like terms. They are also construed according to a sui gene-
ris body of law with both contract and fiduciary characteristics.254 
 
250 OLSON, supra note 125, at 7–8. GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 43; PERLMAN, supra 
note 122, at 150–51. Scholars have debated the relative merit of collective bargaining 
agreements and legislation. Andrias, supra note 156, at 648. Those preferring collective 
bargaining agreements tout their immediacy, flexibility, and informality. PERLMAN, supra 
note 122, at 151. Those favoring legislation note that it promotes uniformity and insulates 
the subject of the law from erosive private negotiation. GREENWOOD, supra note 7, at 60. 
251 Kroncke, supra note 119, at 649; Moore, supra note 119, at 424, 426. 
252 Kroncke, supra note 119, at 649; Moore, supra note 119, at 424. 
253 Moore, supra note 119, at 424, 426. 
254 Kroncke, supra note 119, at 647–48 (citation omitted); Posner, supra note 118, at 999 
(citing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456–57 (1957)); SELZNICK, 
supra note 92, at 139. Despite a popular inclination to regard collective bargaining 
agreements as contracts, the aim and operation of these agreements defy some precepts 
underlying contract law while satisfying others. Id. at 139, 141, 150. Philip Selznick 
describes the appeal of applying contract law to collective bargaining agreements as 
attributable to the “celebration of voluntarism and bargaining as foundations of labor 
policy.” Id. at 139. The law of collective bargaining was to be similar to traditional contract 
law in that its chief aim was to facilitate private arrangements and transactions. Id. The 
parties were to remain free and autonomous. Id. They were to settle for themselves the 
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Rather than simply define the terms of an exchange of services for 
payment, collective bargaining agreements restructure workplace 
decision-making;255 within a certain sphere, the employer and the 
union cooperate and share authority.256 Hence, the parties become 
committed to an ongoing relationship with one another that eludes 
the voluntaristic, limited commitment, and bounded character of 
contract.257 Moreover, akin to a fiduciary agreement, a collective 
bargaining agreement requires the dialogic communication of both 
parties—an employer may not dictate its terms.258 And, like a fidu-
ciary agreement, law, rather than private agreement, determines 
many aspects of the employment relationship and collective bar-
gaining.259 Akin to contract, these agreements contain a number of 
specific terms, such as wage rates, paid holidays, safety measures, 
and grievance procedures, while other terms come close to fiduciary 
obligations, such as those that state the parties’ respective rights and 
commitments.260 Additionally, though  collective bargaining agree-
ments require mutual consent, akin to contracts, they are interpreted 
under the rubric of the parties’ relationship, much like fiduciary ob-
ligations.261 
A collective bargaining agreement is a similarly attractive de-
vice to formalize and entrench platform democracy with respect to 
information privacy. Such an agreement—between a consumer col-
lective bargaining organization and a platform—can promote plat-
form accountability and provide consumers a set of concrete privacy 
 
exact terms of their cooperation. Id. Moreover, from the standpoint of the unions, the idea 
of contract offered a convenient way of formalizing the recognition won and concessions 
extracted. Id. The union was recognized when it became a party to a written agreement, 
and the terms of that agreement could stand as evidence of what the employer had granted. 
Id. The rhetoric of the times cared little for the difference between a contract proper, 
meeting determinate legal criteria, and other forms of agreement. Id. See REES, supra note 
128, at 30; PERLMAN, supra note 122, at 151 (citation omitted). 
255 SELZNICK, supra note 92, at 141, 152. Selznick describes this restructuring as forming 
a “social contract” for a kind of political community. Id. at 152. 
256 Id. at 145. 
257 Id. at 145, 146, 151, 152. 
258 PERLMAN, supra note 122, at 151 (citation omitted). 
259 SELZNICK, supra note 92, at 144–45; Daniel Markovits, Sharing Ex Ante and Sharing 
Ex Post: The Non-Contractual Basis of Fiduciary Relations, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 218 (Andrew Gold & Paul Miller eds., 2014). 
260 SELZNICK, supra note 92, at 145; Markovits, supra note 259, at 215. 
261 SELZNICK, supra note 92, at 146; Markovits, supra note 259, at 216–17. 
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rights and protections through a mix of contract and fiduciary terms. 
For example, a collective bargaining agreement may call on the plat-
form to take on broad fiduciary obligations to act in consumers’ best 
interest with respect to their personal information,262 while prohib-
iting the collection and use of certain types of information, such as 
information related to health and medical conditions. Fiduciary 
terms allow a collective bargaining agreement to remain flexible 
while requiring the platform to provide more than a bare legal min-
imum of information privacy protections. They also support the in-
terpretation of consumers’ rights and the platform’s responsibilities 
based on the parties’ relationship, rather than consumers’ blanket 
consent. Additionally, a collective bargaining agreement can em-
power consumers to hold a platform accountable by including mech-
anisms that enable the collective bargaining organization to verify 
its ongoing compliance. 
Collective bargaining agreements’ limited duration also sup-
ports platform democracy; every so often, the consumer collective 
bargaining organization and the platform will have to return to the 
bargaining table to re-negotiate the agreement’s terms. This ongo-
ing, iterative process allows the agreement to reflect society’s fluc-
tuating information privacy norms and adapt to new technologies as 
they are developed. And, practically, collective bargaining agree-
ments offer certain advantages over law—they may be entered more 
quickly than a law is promulgated, they are unlikely to attract First 
Amendment scrutiny because they are agreements between private 
parties,263 and they may be much more finely tailored to the parties. 
A collective bargaining agreement between a platform and a 
consumer bargaining organization would be characteristically dif-
ferent than one between an employer and a labor union. In the labor 
context, the agreement affords both the employer and its workers 
 
262 See generally Balkin, supra note 35. Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 38, at 298 
(citation omitted) (suggesting decisions at the corporate level may provide the best way to 
avoid privacy harms). 
263 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling 
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 
(2000) (arguing contracts that enforce privacy rights are unlikely to warrant First 
Amendment scrutiny because they are private, voluntary agreements). 
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rights and responsibilities.264 For example, the employer agrees to 
pay a certain wage and it retains the right to make unilateral hiring 
and firing decisions. The worker agrees to refrain from engaging in 
unauthorized (“wildcat”) strikes but retains the right to engage in 
union-authorized strikes. In the platform context, the agreement 
would likely tilt in favor of consumers—it would afford consumers 
a set of rights and oblige the platform to a set of responsibilities. A 
consumer collective bargaining agreement is unlikely to require 
consumers to use a platform or provide it certain personal infor-
mation. Additionally, whereas a labor collective bargaining agree-
ment covers a fairly limited set of interests (e.g., wages, workplace 
safety, seniority rights, and grievance procedures), it may be diffi-
cult for a consumer collective bargaining agreement to cover what 
may be extensive, context-dependent, and nuanced privacy interests. 
Multi-service platforms may exacerbate this problem; each service 
(e.g., Google’s Search, Maps, Gmail, and Photos) would likely war-
rant its own set of terms. Hence, a consumer collective bargaining 
agreement may need to rely more heavily on fiduciary like terms 
that allocate responsibility broadly and somewhat generally, but it 
may nevertheless include specific protections when they are ascer-
tainable. 
C. Potential Limitations to Consumer Collective Bargaining 
Consumer organization and collective bargaining will confront 
various challenges. First, there is the prospect consumers will not 
cohere sufficiently to support a bargaining organization if consum-
ers’ information privacy preferences are thoroughly idiosyncratic or 
conflicting. Second, there is a risk that platforms will not bargain 
with consumers collectively absent a legal compulsion to do so. 
Third, there is a question of scalability—will a consumer collective 
bargaining organization have to negotiate with each platform indi-
vidually and, if so, how can it influence information privacy protec-
tions in the platform political economy more generally? Finally, 
there is the risk consumers may be held liable under antitrust law for 
engaging in a “mass exit” from a platform as a bargaining chit. 
 
264 SELZNICK, supra note 92, at 151–52. 
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What if individuals’ information privacy preferences are so idi-
osyncratic that it is impossible to articulate a set of information pri-
vacy protections, whether by statute or some other legal mecha-
nism? In the context of consumer collective bargaining, extensive 
idiosyncrasy would thwart consumers’ incentives and abilities to co-
here, first, to form a collective bargaining organization and, second, 
to generate information privacy norms and articulate actionable de-
mands for their protection. These concerns lurked behind labor un-
ion organizing as well and, as such, industrial democracy may in-
form a preliminary response. In the labor context, organizational co-
herence depends on a set of shared common, core goals despite di-
vergent preferences.265 Individual workers may have different pref-
erences with respect to, for instance, seniority benefits or wage in-
creases versus fringe benefits, but the degree of their differences 
ought not impede their desire to join a union and support its decided 
course of action as long as the individual workers cohere on under-
lying, core principles. 
In the information privacy context, idiosyncratic preferences for 
protection may yield to core, unifying goals and values. Survey ev-
idence lends empirical support to the presence of general accord on 
information privacy values.266 Consumers have also demonstrated 
their ability to cohere and mobilize around information privacy 
when incited by a perceived injustice. For example, in 2006, when 
Facebook unrolled its “News Feed,” within 24 hours hundreds of 
thousands of users organized themselves (on Facebook, no less) to 
protest the new feature.267 And in 2009, when Facebook made a 
number of changes that decreased the amount of personal infor-
mation that could be kept private, 80,000 concerned users signed an 
American Civil Liberties Union petition that influenced Facebook 
to reverse some of its actions.268   A consumer collective bargaining 
organization can, through its educative function, nurture consumers’ 
ability to form information privacy norms and help translate them 
into actionable demands on platforms. 
 
265 See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
266 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 39, at 5. 
267 William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 1004 
(2016). 
268 Ozer, supra note 15, at 239 (citations omitted). 
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Another potential limitation to consumers’ collective bargaining 
success is the risk platforms will not come to the bargaining table 
absent legal compulsion.269 The effect of collective bargaining on 
profits will influence the likelihood platforms will engage. A num-
ber of factors will determine the effect of collective bargaining on 
profits. If platforms agree, through collective bargaining agree-
ments, to adopt additional information privacy protections, imple-
menting these protections will involve both production costs to de-
velop and deploy relevant technical measures and opportunity costs 
in the form of profits these privacy protections would impede. These 
costs ought to be balanced against a few ascertainable benefits: first, 
platforms would avoid losses from consumers’ mass exit or adver-
tisers’ secondary boycott; second, platforms would likely have a 
lower risk of costly FTC enforcement action because a negotiated 
collective bargaining agreement would truly instantiate consumers’ 
consent; third, platforms’ public image may improve and thereby 
foment greater consumer engagement; and fourth, platforms that al-
ready offer individuals information privacy controls may reduce 
costs by implementing overarching, rather than individuated, pro-
tections. Whether these factors will tip in favor of or against plat-
form engagement in consumer collective bargaining over infor-
mation privacy remains to be seen. 
Third, a consumer collective bargaining organization working 
toward greater information privacy may find it difficult to scale. If 
the organization’s members are users of a particular platform, 
whether the organization could successfully bargain with a second 
or third platform, or an entire industry, will depend on the degree of 
overlap in consumers across these platforms and their coherence 
around information privacy norms. Regardless whether the organi-
zation can bargain successfully with one or a few platforms, the in-
formation privacy protections that result risk being limited in scale 
 
269 I acknowledge that the promulgation of laws and regulations could support a 
collective bargaining approach to privacy, for instance, by requiring platforms to bargain 
with duly organized intermediaries. As explained in Part I.D., rules affecting society 
ordinarily obtain democratic legitimacy when promulgated by the government; as such, I 
would call for direct government regulation of privacy rather than the passage of laws that 
support collective bargaining alone. My proposal for collective bargaining presumes direct, 
public regulation of privacy is not forthcoming. 
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to those platforms alone. Whereas with legislation or in tort or prop-
erty law, duties apply broadly to a set of covered entities, in a bar-
gaining setting, the duties adopted apply only to the parties to the 
bargain. Moreover, consumers may not be inclined to join multiple, 
separate collective bargaining organizations for each individual 
platform due to governance fatigue and other limits on participation. 
In the information privacy context, there are mechanisms that 
can support the diffusion of information privacy protections beyond 
an individual collective bargaining agreement. If a collective bar-
gaining organization represents a fairly large consumer base, the  
information privacy norms and protections the organization estab-
lishes and demands may influence a greater expectation of infor-
mation privacy among the general public. This augmented consumer 
expectation may support causes of action in tort and impel the FTC 
to enforce a higher standard of information privacy by finding  
“unfair” data-handling practices that do not meet these expectations. 
Collective bargaining agreements with one or a few large platforms 
may have “spillover” effects on smaller businesses. For example, in 
the early 2000s when the FTC began to expect websites to provide 
privacy notices, large websites encouraged compliance among 
smaller websites by threatening to withdraw advertising from web-
sites that failed to provide minimum protections.270 A platform-con-
sumer collective bargaining agreement can require the platform to 
guarantee its business partners’ compliance with prescribed infor-
mation privacy protections. 
Fourth, there is a risk consumers’ “mass exit” from a platform 
to incent the platform to provide greater information privacy protec-
tions may be a restraint on trade that violates the Sherman Act. Con-
sumers’ collective agreement to make certain demands on platforms 
for information privacy protections and to exit if those demands are 
not met may constitute a “combination . . . or conspiracy[] in re-
straint of trade”271 in a technical sense, insofar as consumers’ mass 
exit restrains their supply of personal information to a platform—
their trade in data—or their advertising consumption. However, for 
such an argument to be successful, consumers’ mass exit must have 
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an anticompetitive effect or an unlawful purpose.272 This will be a 
high bar for platforms that are in concentrated markets. And it is 
relatively unlikely that consumers’ mass exit from a dominant plat-
form would dampen competition among consumers as suppliers of 
personal information, if consumers could be conceived as compet-
ing suppliers in the first instance.273 Moreover, Supreme Court prec-
edent in N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co. held the First 
Amendment protects consumer boycotts of businesses for political 
purposes and thus exempts them from potential antitrust liability.274 
In that case, the NAACP organized a boycott of white merchants 
with the purpose of securing civic and business leaders’ compliance 
with a list of demands for equality and racial justice.275 A group of 
white merchants sued, arguing the boycott (alleged as a conspiracy) 
maliciously interfered with their businesses in violation of state 
law.276 The Court held the First Amendment protected the non-vio-
lent elements of the boycotters’ activities and thus state law could 
not penalize them as an unlawful boycott, even though the boycott-
ers foresaw and intended the merchants would sustain economic in-
jury.277 Consumer collective action for information privacy likewise 
may constitute protected First Amendment activity, insofar as it 
seeks a political aim—greater information privacy protections for 
consumers as a sector of society. Economic demands, such as seek-
ing compensation for the value of their personal information to the 
business, likely would not benefit from Claiborne’s holding; rather, 
 
272 Comment, Protest Boycotts Under the Sherman Act, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1131, 1154 
(1980). 
273 Id. at 1149 (“[P]rotest boycotts can escape antitrust liability if . . . when examined 
under the rule of reason they are found to lack significant anticompetitive effects, thus 
qualifying as reasonable restraints of trade.”); id. at 1153 (citations omitted) (“In most 
instances [protest boycotts] will lack both the purpose and effect of inhibiting competition. 
By definition, protest boycotters do not have traditional commercial objectives, so there is 
no danger that concerted pressure might be exerted for the purpose of accomplishing an 
anticompetitive end, such as excluding a competitor or monopolizing a market. In many 
cases the purpose of a protest boycott will be to further a public policy. . . .The effect of a 
protest boycott on competitive conditions will almost always be incidental, and even that 
assumes the boycott can muster sizeable public support for a long enough period of time.”). 
274    NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
275 Id. at 889. 
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277 Id. at 914–15. 
862 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXI:792 
 
they may indicate a “desire to . . . reap economic benefits” by mak-
ing it difficult for the platform to compete.278 
 
CONCLUSION 
Mainstream legal scholarship on information privacy has largely 
focused on its economic contours and breakdowns. Information pri-
vacy has been viewed as a set of individual preferences and actions 
that market forces may optimize. This individualist paradigm, how-
ever, obscures the social foundations of information privacy that 
suggest information privacy ought to be legitimated politically. The 
platform political economy, in which online platforms determine 
hegemonically consumers’ information privacy protections and 
override their information privacy norms, is anything but politically 
legitimate by American-democratic standards. We traditionally base 
political legitimacy on governmental or judicial intervention—inso-
far as they represent the will of the people. Likewise, in the realm of 
information privacy, government ought to protect information pri-
vacy norms that reflect popular will. However, current law and bills 
under consideration delegate privacy decision-making to the private 
sector by relying on self-regulation in the form of notice and choice 
and, in effect, ratify platforms’ hegemony. 
The democratic determination of information privacy is still pos-
sible—private governance may become democratic if consumers are 
able to determine their information privacy norms and the protec-
tions that ought to safeguard them. Industrial democracy theory pro-
vides an analogy that can help inform the information privacy’s 
democratic legitimation within its system of private governance. 
The labor political economy of the late nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries bears numerous similarities to today’s platform politi-
cal economy and industrial democracy theory emerged to propose 
worker collective bargaining as a private counterforce. Industrial de-
mocracy attempted to introduce democratic governance into work-
place decision-making through unionization, with the union serving 
as a forum for deliberative democracy, consolidating worker bar-
gaining power to countervail that of employers, and entering a col-
lective bargaining agreement that entrenches workers’ role in 
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workplace decision-making. The mechanics of these democratic 
structures will look different in the online platform context, due to 
the magnitude of platforms’ bargaining power over information pri-
vacy and the structure of social life online. Even so, their application 
to the platform political economy suggests democratizing platform 
privacy may be possible. 
Democratizing platform privacy, based on a model inspired by 
industrial democracy, may be a first effort among many to reform 
private governance through democratic procedure. Numerous other 
rights and civil liberties are affected by platform hegemony, free 
speech not least of all. This Article focuses on online information 
privacy, both because of the government’s failure to protect online 
information privacy through law and because of the striking paral-
lels between the platform political economy and the labor political 
economy. To the extent consumers are able to organize, bargain, and 
bind platforms successfully, the collective bargaining organization 
they form could prove useful to democratize private governance of 
myriad other rights as well. 
